c1aa2ebec5be18c19cfbb3cc87659ec5d3af4734
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 alexei.dolgolyov
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0e3ae78de7 |
fix(devices): address pre-merge review findings
Closes the issues surfaced by the pre-merge code review of the expand-device-support branch. CRITICAL #2 -- update_device double-encrypts secrets in memory. storage/device_store.py round-tripped through device.to_dict() which encrypts hue_username / hue_client_key / ble_govee_key / nanoleaf_token via _enc(), but Device.__init__ does not decrypt. The cached self._items[device_id] thus held ciphertext where plaintext belonged, breaking runtime auth for paired devices on any update -- even an innocuous rename. Sourcing kwargs from vars(device) directly avoids the round-trip. Regression tests cover Nanoleaf and Hue. HIGH #3 -- secrets leaked in GET /api/v1/devices response. DeviceResponse previously returned nanoleaf_token / hue_username / hue_client_key in plaintext (decrypted server-side from storage), defeating the encryption-at-rest. Replaced with nanoleaf_paired and hue_paired booleans. ble_govee_key intentionally stays -- it's a user-managed value pasted from a third-party tool, must remain visible for edit. Frontend types.ts + the one nanoleaf_token reader updated to the boolean. HIGH #4 -- SSRF surface. validate_lan_host() added to net_classify.py; called from each new driver's validate_device (DDP / Yeelight / WiZ / LIFX / Govee / OPC / Nanoleaf) and from pair_device. Rejects literal public IPs with a descriptive ValueError; non-IP hostnames pass through (mDNS labels, bare hostnames). RFC6890 ranges (documentation, former class E) are accepted as LAN-like since Python's ipaddress.is_private treats them so -- correct policy for LedGrab. HIGH #5 -- decrypt failure deletes the device row. _dec() now catches the exception, logs an error, and returns "" instead of propagating. Without the fix, a regenerated data/.secret_key would silently make every Hue / Nanoleaf / BLE-Govee device disappear from the device list on next startup. Regression test asserts a corrupt envelope leaves the device hydratable. HIGH #6 -- update_device route does not rstrip("/") for non-WLED. Moved the trim before the WLED-specific scheme inference so every device type gets consistent URL normalization between create and update. MEDIUM #7 -- Govee discovery port 4002 collision. Added a lazily- initialized module-level asyncio.Lock that serializes concurrent discover_govee_devices() calls; the previous behavior had the second parallel scan silently return [] when the first still held port 4002. Error message also clarified to mention another Govee tool. MEDIUM #8 -- Nanoleaf discover() leaked browser tasks on cancellation. Moved the browser cancel loop into the finally block so an interrupted mDNS scan still tears them down. MEDIUM #9 -- pair endpoint logged user-supplied URL with exc_info=True. Added _sanitize_url_for_log() that strips userinfo + fragment, and demoted the log from exc_info to type(exc).__name__ + str(exc) so a hostile receiver's response body can't end up in the log file. LOW -- Nanoleaf was the only client without a .port property. Added one (returns NANOLEAF_PORT, fixed) for cross-driver symmetry. LOW -- no end-to-end pair-then-create coverage. Added TestPairThenCreateFlow.test_pair_then_create_persists_encrypted_token which exercises the full path: POST /api/v1/devices/pair returned fields, store.create_device, then asserts (a) in-memory plaintext, (b) to_config() plaintext, (c) persisted ciphertext, (d) API response strip + paired-boolean. Tests: 1379 pass (was 1358 -- 21 new regression tests added). ruff clean. TypeScript clean. |
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alexei.dolgolyov
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426484adf8 |
feat(devices): Nanoleaf OpenAPI target type + first pair-flow user
Adds support for Nanoleaf controllers (Light Panels / Canvas / Shapes /
Lines / Elements) via the documented HTTP REST API on port 16021.
First concrete consumer of the pair-UX scaffold from commit
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