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ledgrab/server/tests/test_net_classify.py
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alexei.dolgolyov 0e3ae78de7 fix(devices): address pre-merge review findings
Closes the issues surfaced by the pre-merge code review of the
expand-device-support branch.

CRITICAL #2 -- update_device double-encrypts secrets in memory.
storage/device_store.py round-tripped through device.to_dict() which
encrypts hue_username / hue_client_key / ble_govee_key / nanoleaf_token
via _enc(), but Device.__init__ does not decrypt. The cached
self._items[device_id] thus held ciphertext where plaintext belonged,
breaking runtime auth for paired devices on any update -- even an
innocuous rename. Sourcing kwargs from vars(device) directly avoids
the round-trip. Regression tests cover Nanoleaf and Hue.

HIGH #3 -- secrets leaked in GET /api/v1/devices response.
DeviceResponse previously returned nanoleaf_token / hue_username /
hue_client_key in plaintext (decrypted server-side from storage),
defeating the encryption-at-rest. Replaced with nanoleaf_paired and
hue_paired booleans. ble_govee_key intentionally stays -- it's a
user-managed value pasted from a third-party tool, must remain visible
for edit. Frontend types.ts + the one nanoleaf_token reader updated to
the boolean.

HIGH #4 -- SSRF surface. validate_lan_host() added to net_classify.py;
called from each new driver's validate_device (DDP / Yeelight / WiZ /
LIFX / Govee / OPC / Nanoleaf) and from pair_device. Rejects literal
public IPs with a descriptive ValueError; non-IP hostnames pass
through (mDNS labels, bare hostnames). RFC6890 ranges (documentation,
former class E) are accepted as LAN-like since Python's
ipaddress.is_private treats them so -- correct policy for LedGrab.

HIGH #5 -- decrypt failure deletes the device row. _dec() now catches
the exception, logs an error, and returns "" instead of propagating.
Without the fix, a regenerated data/.secret_key would silently make
every Hue / Nanoleaf / BLE-Govee device disappear from the device list
on next startup. Regression test asserts a corrupt envelope leaves the
device hydratable.

HIGH #6 -- update_device route does not rstrip("/") for non-WLED.
Moved the trim before the WLED-specific scheme inference so every
device type gets consistent URL normalization between create and
update.

MEDIUM #7 -- Govee discovery port 4002 collision. Added a lazily-
initialized module-level asyncio.Lock that serializes concurrent
discover_govee_devices() calls; the previous behavior had the second
parallel scan silently return [] when the first still held port 4002.
Error message also clarified to mention another Govee tool.

MEDIUM #8 -- Nanoleaf discover() leaked browser tasks on cancellation.
Moved the browser cancel loop into the finally block so an interrupted
mDNS scan still tears them down.

MEDIUM #9 -- pair endpoint logged user-supplied URL with exc_info=True.
Added _sanitize_url_for_log() that strips userinfo + fragment, and
demoted the log from exc_info to type(exc).__name__ + str(exc) so a
hostile receiver's response body can't end up in the log file.

LOW -- Nanoleaf was the only client without a .port property. Added
one (returns NANOLEAF_PORT, fixed) for cross-driver symmetry.

LOW -- no end-to-end pair-then-create coverage. Added
TestPairThenCreateFlow.test_pair_then_create_persists_encrypted_token
which exercises the full path: POST /api/v1/devices/pair returned
fields, store.create_device, then asserts (a) in-memory plaintext,
(b) to_config() plaintext, (c) persisted ciphertext, (d) API response
strip + paired-boolean.

Tests: 1379 pass (was 1358 -- 21 new regression tests added).
ruff clean. TypeScript clean.
2026-05-16 11:06:10 +03:00

190 lines
5.8 KiB
Python

"""Tests for ledgrab.utils.net_classify."""
import pytest
from ledgrab.utils.net_classify import (
HostCategory,
classify_ip,
is_blocked_for_ssrf,
is_local_for_http_default,
is_loopback,
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host,expected",
[
("127.0.0.1", HostCategory.LOOPBACK),
("::1", HostCategory.LOOPBACK),
("10.0.0.5", HostCategory.PRIVATE),
("192.168.1.1", HostCategory.PRIVATE),
("172.16.0.5", HostCategory.PRIVATE),
("fd00::1", HostCategory.PRIVATE), # ULA
("169.254.1.1", HostCategory.LINK_LOCAL),
("fe80::1", HostCategory.LINK_LOCAL),
("0.0.0.0", HostCategory.UNSPECIFIED),
("::", HostCategory.UNSPECIFIED),
("224.0.0.1", HostCategory.MULTICAST),
("ff00::1", HostCategory.MULTICAST),
# ``240.0.0.0/4`` (class E) is labelled both ``is_private`` and
# ``is_reserved`` by Python; we keep PRIVATE first which is the
# stricter SSRF policy.
("240.0.0.1", HostCategory.PRIVATE),
("8.8.8.8", HostCategory.PUBLIC),
("1.1.1.1", HostCategory.PUBLIC),
("2606:4700:4700::1111", HostCategory.PUBLIC),
("not-an-ip", HostCategory.UNPARSEABLE),
("", HostCategory.UNPARSEABLE),
("example.com", HostCategory.UNPARSEABLE),
],
)
def test_classify_ip(host: str, expected: HostCategory) -> None:
assert classify_ip(host) is expected
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SSRF block list — must include EVERY non-public category, including
# unparseable inputs. Regression guard: if anyone narrows this set we lose
# SSRF protection.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host",
[
"127.0.0.1",
"::1",
"10.0.0.5",
"192.168.1.1",
"172.16.0.5",
"fd00::1",
"169.254.1.1",
"fe80::1",
"0.0.0.0",
"::",
"224.0.0.1",
"ff00::1",
"240.0.0.1",
"not-an-ip", # unparseable → blocked
"", # unparseable → blocked
],
)
def test_is_blocked_for_ssrf_blocks_non_public(host: str) -> None:
assert is_blocked_for_ssrf(host) is True
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host",
["8.8.8.8", "1.1.1.1", "2606:4700:4700::1111"],
)
def test_is_blocked_for_ssrf_allows_public(host: str) -> None:
assert is_blocked_for_ssrf(host) is False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# LAN-default policy — narrower than SSRF: we infer ``http://`` for loopback
# / private / link-local / unspecified, NOT for multicast / reserved /
# unparseable (those should fall through to ``https://`` or to caller-side
# heuristics like mDNS suffix matching).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host",
["127.0.0.1", "::1", "10.0.0.5", "192.168.1.1", "fe80::1", "0.0.0.0"],
)
def test_is_local_for_http_default_true(host: str) -> None:
assert is_local_for_http_default(host) is True
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host",
["8.8.8.8", "224.0.0.1", "not-an-ip", ""],
)
def test_is_local_for_http_default_false(host: str) -> None:
assert is_local_for_http_default(host) is False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Loopback predicate — accepts both literals and the auth module's textual
# placeholders (localhost, testclient).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host",
[
"127.0.0.1",
"127.0.0.5",
"::1",
"localhost",
"LOCALHOST",
"testclient",
"[::1]",
"fe80::1%eth0", # ← link-local with zone — must NOT match
],
)
def test_is_loopback_recognises_loopback(host: str) -> None:
expected = host != "fe80::1%eth0"
assert is_loopback(host) is expected
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host",
["8.8.8.8", "10.0.0.5", "example.com", "", None],
)
def test_is_loopback_rejects_other(host) -> None:
assert is_loopback(host) is False
# ─── validate_lan_host ────────────────────────────────────────────
from ledgrab.utils.net_classify import validate_lan_host # noqa: E402
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host",
[
"127.0.0.1",
"10.0.0.5",
"192.168.1.50",
"172.16.0.10",
"fe80::1",
"fc00::1",
"0.0.0.0",
# IPv6 with brackets and zone id
"[fe80::1%eth0]",
# Plain hostnames pass through (mDNS / bare-label)
"bulb.local",
"office-strip",
"controller.lan",
"", # empty also passes (caller handles validation upstream)
],
)
def test_validate_lan_host_accepts_local(host) -> None:
"""Loopback / private / link-local / hostnames must not raise."""
validate_lan_host(host)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host",
[
"1.1.1.1", # Cloudflare DNS (routable public)
"8.8.8.8", # Google DNS
"224.0.0.1", # multicast — not a LAN device address
"2606:4700:4700::1111", # Cloudflare DNS IPv6
],
)
def test_validate_lan_host_rejects_public_or_multicast(host) -> None:
"""Reject genuinely-public addresses and multicast targets.
Note: Python's :func:`ipaddress.ip_address(...).is_private` treats
RFC6890 ranges (documentation 192.0.2/24, former class E 240/4, etc.)
as private, so those are accepted as "local-ish" by our classifier --
which is the correct policy for LedGrab: those ranges aren't routable
public addresses, and refusing them would be unhelpful theatre.
"""
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="LedGrab is LAN-only"):
validate_lan_host(host)