fix: production-readiness hardening — security, perf, a11y, observability
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Lint & Test / test (push) Successful in 20s
Security - Default scripts_management, callbacks_management, links_management, and media_folders_management to False so a leaked token cannot escalate to RCE through admin CRUD endpoints. - TokenSpec + scope hierarchy (read | control | admin); legacy bare-string api_tokens entries promote to admin for back-compat. Management endpoints now require admin scope. - WebSocket subprotocol auth (Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: media-server.token.<T>) preferred over ?token= query so the token no longer lands in URL/history/ Referer; query fallback retained for HA integration back-compat. - Origin allow-list check on the WS endpoint (CSWSH defence). - In-process token-bucket rate limiter: 5/min for failed auths, 10/min for /api/scripts/execute and /api/callbacks/execute. - shell=False subprocess path (shlex.split) + per-parameter regex `pattern` in ScriptParameterConfig to harden shell=true scripts against parameter injection (Windows cmd.exe env-var expansion). - CSP gains form-action, worker-src, manifest-src directives. - Refuse cors_origins=["*"] at startup; strip token=... from uvicorn access logs; validate Gitea release tag against strict SemVer regex. - noopener noreferrer + no-referrer referrerpolicy on every outbound link. - icacls hardening of config.yaml on Windows (current user + SYSTEM + Administrators only); 0600 still enforced on POSIX. - WS volume handler clamps input and never drops the socket on bad messages. Performance - Album-art read in windows_media gated by track key — was decoding the WinRT thumbnail twice per second regardless of track changes. - /api/media/artwork returns content-derived ETag + Cache-Control so the browser sends If-None-Match and gets 304s on track repeats. - Foreground-service ctypes argtypes hoisted to one-time module init (was re-declaring ~14 prototypes per probe). - display_service _static_cache keyed by (edid_hash, ...) tuple with eviction of disappeared monitors — fixes stale capabilities on hot-plug swaps where the new topology has the same monitor count. - Visualizer rAF loop paused on document.hidden, resumed on visible. Reliability / bug fixes - Lifespan rewritten as try/yield/finally so a partial-startup failure cannot orphan background tasks or executors. - _run_callback in routes/media.py keeps a strong task ref (GC-safe) and uses the dedicated callback executor instead of the default pool. - macos_media.set_volume() no longer always returns True. - TrayManager._restart_requested initialised in __init__; set before signalling exit so the main thread observes it correctly. - Missing static_dir now logs a WARNING instead of silent UI disable. UX / accessibility / PWA - manifest.json theme_color and background_color match the Studio Reference base (#0E0D0B); added id and scope for PWA installability. - ARIA on mini-player icon buttons; inner SVGs marked aria-hidden. - OS mediaSession API wired so headset / lockscreen / Bluetooth buttons drive play/pause/next/prev/seek and show track metadata + artwork. Observability - X-Request-ID middleware (accept upstream id if it matches a safe regex, otherwise UUID4); request_id_var added to ContextVars and included in every log line alongside the token label. - Audit log (append-only JSONL) for every script + callback execution, including the on_play/on_pause/etc. event callbacks. Background-thread writer; queue capped; flushed in lifespan teardown. Deployment - proxy_headers + forwarded_allow_ips plumbed through Settings → uvicorn.Config for reverse-proxy installs. - HTTPS support via ssl_certfile + ssl_keyfile (+ optional password); startup refuses to launch with only one of the pair set. - Thumbnail cache moved from project-root .cache to %LOCALAPPDATA%/media-server/cache (Windows) and $XDG_CACHE_HOME/media-server/thumbnails (POSIX). Tests - 35 new tests across auth scopes, rate limiter, browser path traversal (../ NUL UNC absolute), script-param validation incl. regex, Gitea tag whitelist, config atomic write + POSIX perms. 47 passed / 4 skipped.
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@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ security = HTTPBearer(auto_error=False)
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# Context variable to store current request's token label
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token_label_var: ContextVar[str] = ContextVar("token_label", default="unknown")
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# Per-request correlation ID — generated in middleware if upstream didn't send one.
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request_id_var: ContextVar[str] = ContextVar("request_id", default="-")
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def auth_enabled() -> bool:
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@@ -29,12 +31,42 @@ def get_token_label(token: str) -> Optional[str]:
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Returns:
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The label for the token, or None if invalid
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"""
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for label, stored_token in settings.api_tokens.items():
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if secrets.compare_digest(stored_token, token):
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for label, spec in settings.api_tokens.items():
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if secrets.compare_digest(spec.token, token):
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return label
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return None
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def token_has_scope(label: str, required: str) -> bool:
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"""Whether the token identified by `label` grants `required` scope."""
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spec = settings.api_tokens.get(label)
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if spec is None:
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# Unknown label = no auth or anonymous; treat as full access only
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# when auth is disabled entirely (matches existing behaviour).
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return not auth_enabled()
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return spec.grants(required)
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def require_scope(scope: str):
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"""Build a FastAPI dependency that enforces the given scope.
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Use as ``Depends(require_scope("admin"))`` on management endpoints. When
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auth is disabled the dependency is a no-op (anonymous access).
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"""
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async def _checker(label: str = Depends(verify_token)) -> str:
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if not auth_enabled():
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return label
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if not token_has_scope(label, scope):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail=f"Token '{label}' lacks required scope: {scope}",
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)
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return label
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return _checker
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async def verify_token(
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request: Request,
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credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(security),
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