feat: production readiness — security, perf, bug fixes, bridge self-monitoring

Comprehensive multi-area pass driven by a parallel 8-agent production
review. Frontend, backend, database, security, performance, operational,
plus a new self-monitoring feature.

## Critical fixes
- Planka webhook: reads bounded raw body (was NameError on every call)
- HA quiet hours: ha_state_changed/automation_triggered/service_called/
  event_fired added to deferrable set (were silently dropped)
- DNS-rebinding SSRF: PinnedResolver wired into shared aiohttp session
- Telegram inbound webhook: secret now mandatory (401 without)
- Generic webhook: auth_mode="none" requires explicit
  acknowledge_unauthenticated=true; per-IP rate limit 60/min
- svelte-check: 5 null-narrowing errors in EventDetailModal fixed
- Provider hardcoding: Immich-only block extracted to descriptor
  featureDiscoveryHint
- command_sync: snapshot+expunge bot before exiting AsyncSession

## Bug fixes
- notifier asyncio.gather(return_exceptions=True) — one bad chat no longer
  cancels peer sends
- NotificationDispatcher hoisted out of per-tracker loop
- Provider credential resolution unified across all 5 dispatch sites
- HA asyncio.shield now drains inner task on cancellation
- Provider construction switched from if/elif ladder to factory registry
- NUT first poll seeds silently (no spurious ups_on_battery)
- Quiet-hours gate: event-type-disabled now wins over deferral
- APScheduler drain job ID resolution upgraded to seconds
- HA on_status_change wired through to EventLog
- Webhook payload rollback failures now logged (not swallowed)
- Batched receivers/chats/bots in load_link_data (was per-target N+1)
- flag_modified on JSON column reassignments in deferred_dispatch

## Database
- UNIQUE indexes on service_provider.webhook_token,
  telegram_bot.webhook_path_id, partial UNIQUE on telegram_bot.bot_id,
  telegram_chat(bot_id, chat_id), notification_tracker_target unique link,
  partial UNIQUE on bridge_self provider per user
- Composite ix_event_log_user_event_type_created index
- save_chat_from_webhook switched to ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE
- ondelete=CASCADE on user-id FKs (model annotation; app-side cascade
  delete added for existing data)
- delete_notification_tracker converted from N+1 to bulk DELETE/UPDATE
- Module-level asyncio.Lock replaced with lazy _get_lock() pattern
- VACUUM INTO snapshot now PRAGMA integrity_check verified

## Performance
- Jinja2 template compilation LRU cached (lru_cache maxsize=512)
- Per-locale render cache in NotificationDispatcher (skips re-rendering
  identical content for receivers sharing a locale)
- Tracker list cached per provider_id with 5s TTL + explicit invalidation
  on tracker CRUD (relieves HA chat-bus rate query pressure)
- Nav-counts collapsed from 16 round-trips to single UNION ALL
- HA event_log: skip persisting empty assets_added/removed events

## Security hardening
- Mass-assignment guard on Action create/update; cron sub-minute reject
- Backup JSON depth/node-count cap (depth ≤ 10, nodes ≤ 100k)
- _sanitize_config extended to all JSON-typed fields on backup import
- Telegram _safe_get walks redirects manually with SSRF revalidation
- Bcrypt 72-byte password length cap with clear 422
- Webhook payload body redaction; sensitive substring set extended with
  oauth/client_secret/webhook_secret/csrf in both header filter and
  template extras filter

## Frontend
- 76 catch (err: any) sites converted to errMsg(err) helper
- globalProviderFilter: pure getter; reconciliation moved to one-time
  $effect in +layout
- Provider-filter binding: removed paired $effects + _syncingFilter flag,
  now one-way derived
- entity-cache: separate _refreshing flag for background re-fetches
- api.ts 401 handling: AuthRedirectError class + dedup _redirecting flag,
  goto() instead of window.location.href
- a11y: aria-expanded on mobile More, role=switch + aria-checked on
  Telegram bot toggles

## Tests & operations
- CI pytest gate added to .gitea/workflows/build.yml + release.yml
  (wheel-built install to dodge editable-install slowness)
- /api/ready upgraded to deep healthcheck (db SELECT 1, scheduler.running,
  HA supervisor presence) returning {ready, checks, errors, version}
- /api/metrics endpoint with prometheus_client (deferred_pending,
  event_log_total, dispatch_duration, poll_failures, send_failures)
- New OPERATIONS.md covering deploy, healthchecks, metrics, backup/restore
  procedures, log handling, common scenarios, upgrade flow
- New tests: test_bridge_self (11), test_gitea_parser (9),
  test_planka_parser (6), test_immich_change_detector (6),
  test_backup_roundtrip (1)

## New feature: bridge self-monitoring
- New bridge_self provider type — internal sink for bridge health events
- Three event types: bridge_self_poll_failures (consecutive tracker poll
  failures), bridge_self_deferred_backlog (pending count crosses
  threshold), bridge_self_target_failures (consecutive 5xx/network
  failures per target)
- Per-user thresholds (defaults: 3 / 100 / 5) configurable via the
  provider config form
- Auto-seeded on user create + /setup + boot backfill for existing users
- Anti-spam: counters reset after emission; backlog uses transition latch
- Self-loop guard: bridge_self failures don't count toward target-failure
  thresholds (logged only) — wire to your own Telegram/Email/Matrix to
  get notified when polls/dispatches/sends fail
- 6 default templates (3 events × 2 locales), tracking config columns
  with backfill migration, frontend descriptor (excluded from "create
  provider" wizard since auto-managed)

Operator-visible behavior changes (call out in release notes):
- NOTIFY_BRIDGE_TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET now REQUIRED for webhook mode
- Existing webhook providers with auth_mode="none" need explicit opt-in
- Generic webhook endpoint rate-limited 60/min per source IP
- HA disconnect/reconnect writes ha_status_* EventLog rows
- Every user gets a bridge_self provider — wire it to a target to
  receive failure alerts

Pre-existing test failures (test_ssrf, test_release_provider) on
Python 3.13 are unrelated; CI runs on 3.12.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/auth/routes.py

@@ -50,7 +50,12 @@ class RefreshRequest(BaseModel):
 
 
 async def _hash_password(password: str) -> str:
-    """bcrypt.hashpw is CPU-bound (~200-500ms); never run it on the event loop."""
+    """bcrypt.hashpw is CPU-bound (~200-500ms); never run it on the event loop.
+
+    Caller is responsible for length-validating ``password`` against the
+    72-byte bcrypt cap before calling — bcrypt silently truncates beyond
+    that, which is a correctness footgun, not a security one.
+    """
 
     def _work() -> str:
         return bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode()
@@ -58,6 +63,24 @@ async def _hash_password(password: str) -> str:
     return await asyncio.to_thread(_work)
 
 
+# bcrypt's algorithm cap — the underlying primitive truncates input
+# beyond this so two distinct passwords sharing a 72-byte prefix would
+# verify identically. We reject up-front with a clear 422 message.
+_BCRYPT_MAX_PASSWORD_BYTES = 72
+
+
+def _check_bcrypt_length(password: str) -> None:
+    if len(password.encode("utf-8")) > _BCRYPT_MAX_PASSWORD_BYTES:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=422,
+            detail=(
+                f"Password too long; bcrypt limit is "
+                f"{_BCRYPT_MAX_PASSWORD_BYTES} bytes (longer passwords would "
+                "be silently truncated)"
+            ),
+        )
+
+
 async def _verify_password(password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
     def _work() -> bool:
         try:
@@ -74,6 +97,7 @@ async def _verify_password(password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
 async def setup(request: Request, body: SetupRequest, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)):
     if len(body.password) < 8:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Password must be at least 8 characters")
+    _check_bcrypt_length(body.password)
     # Compute hash BEFORE opening the transaction so we don't hold a writer lock
     # during the CPU-bound bcrypt work.
     hashed = await _hash_password(body.password)
@@ -97,6 +121,16 @@ async def setup(request: Request, body: SetupRequest, session: AsyncSession = De
         session.add(user)
     await session.refresh(user)
 
+    # Auto-create the bridge_self provider for the new admin so internal-
+    # failure notifications work out of the box. Best-effort — a seeding
+    # failure should not abort setup.
+    try:
+        from ..database.seeds import ensure_bridge_self_provider_for_user
+        await ensure_bridge_self_provider_for_user(session, user.id)
+        await session.commit()
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001
+        await session.rollback()
+
     return TokenResponse(
         access_token=create_access_token(user.id, user.role, user.token_version),
         refresh_token=create_refresh_token(user.id, user.token_version),
@@ -170,6 +204,7 @@ async def change_password(
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Current password is incorrect")
     if len(body.new_password) < 8:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="New password must be at least 8 characters")
+    _check_bcrypt_length(body.new_password)
     user.hashed_password = await _hash_password(body.new_password)
     user.token_version = (user.token_version or 1) + 1
     session.add(user)