feat: production-readiness hardening across security, async, DB, ops
Security - SSRF: async DNS resolver; allow_redirects=False on all outbound clients; matrix homeserver_url validated on create/update/test; update_provider and email_bot merge incoming config and reject ***-masked secrets. - Auth: bcrypt offloaded to asyncio.to_thread; JWT now carries iss/aud + leeway and rejects missing claims; setup TOCTOU closed inside a transaction; rate limits extended (default 600/min, 10/min on password change, 30/min on needs-setup); constant-time login to prevent username enumeration. - Config: rejects known dev secret keys; validates CORS origin schemes, port range, token lifetimes. - Webhook handlers stream-read body with a 1 MiB cap; Discord 429 retries bounded (3 attempts, Retry-After capped at 60 s). - CSP + HSTS added to SecurityHeadersMiddleware. Async / runtime - SQLite engine: WAL, synchronous=NORMAL, foreign_keys=ON, busy_timeout, pool_pre_ping, dispose on shutdown. - Lifespan shutdown now stops scheduler before closing HTTP session and disposing the engine. - Shared aiohttp session locked against concurrent first-caller races; core NotificationDispatcher accepts and reuses it. - Storage and scheduled backup writes wrapped in asyncio.to_thread. - NUT client writes bounded by asyncio.wait_for. - Telegram poller switched from 3 s short-poll to 30 s interval + 25 s long-poll (~10x fewer API calls). Database - New performance-indexes migration covers every FK/owner column and hot-path composite (notification_tracker(provider_id, enabled); event_log(user_id, created_at DESC); webhook_payload_log(provider_id, created_at DESC); action_execution(action_id, started_at DESC)). - New schema_version table for future upgrade gating. - __system__ placeholder user (id=0) seeded so user_id=0 system defaults satisfy the newly enforced FK; filtered out of /auth/needs-setup, /api/users, and setup. - list_notification_trackers rewritten to batched loads (was 1+N+N*M). - Retention job extended to event_log, webhook_payload_log, and action_execution; retention days exposed as a setting. Scheduler - AsyncIOScheduler job_defaults: coalesce, misfire_grace_time=300, max_instances=1. Ops - uvicorn runs with proxy_headers, forwarded_allow_ips, timeout_graceful_shutdown; access log suppressed in non-debug. - FastAPI version string now reads from importlib.metadata. - New /api/ready endpoint separate from /api/health. - docker-compose drops the ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=1 default, adds mem/cpu/pid limits, read_only + tmpfs, cap_drop:ALL, no-new-privileges; healthcheck targets /api/ready. - CI now runs on push/PR with backend pytest, frontend svelte-check + build, and a non-push image build; release workflow gated on tests, publishes immutable sha-<commit> image tag, adds Trivy scan. Tests - New packages/server/tests/ with 29 passing tests: config validation, JWT round-trip + aud/alg=none rejection, SSRF scheme and private-range enforcement (sync + async), Discord bounded retry, and a lifespan-level /api/health + /api/ready smoke check. - Renamed the misnamed services/test_dispatch.py to manual_dispatch.py so pytest never auto-collects production code. Frontend - /login now redirects already-authenticated users to /, shows a distinct 'backend unreachable' banner (en/ru) when /auth/needs-setup fails.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -2,8 +2,20 @@
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any
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from urllib.parse import urlparse
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from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings
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# Secret keys we will actively refuse. These cover the default template value
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# and dev-only literals that have appeared in scripts or documentation.
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_FORBIDDEN_SECRETS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
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{
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"change-me-in-production",
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"test-secret-key-minimum-32-chars",
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"dev-secret-key-not-for-production",
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}
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)
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class Settings(BaseSettings):
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"""Application settings loaded from environment variables."""
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@@ -13,29 +25,25 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
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secret_key: str = "change-me-in-production"
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def model_post_init(self, __context: Any) -> None:
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if self.secret_key == "change-me-in-production":
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raise ValueError(
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"SECURITY: Refusing to start with the default secret_key. "
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"Set NOTIFY_BRIDGE_SECRET_KEY to a random value (>=32 bytes) "
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"before starting the server (debug mode included)."
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)
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if len(self.secret_key) < 32:
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raise ValueError(
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"SECURITY: NOTIFY_BRIDGE_SECRET_KEY must be at least 32 characters."
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)
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if "*" in self.cors_allowed_origins.split(","):
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raise ValueError(
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"SECURITY: wildcard '*' is not allowed in CORS origins when credentials are enabled."
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)
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access_token_expire_minutes: int = 60
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access_token_expire_minutes: int = 15
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refresh_token_expire_days: int = 30
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jwt_issuer: str = "notify-bridge"
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jwt_audience: str = "notify-bridge-api"
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host: str = "0.0.0.0"
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port: int = 8420
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debug: bool = False
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# Comma-separated list of trusted proxy IPs uvicorn will honor for
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# X-Forwarded-For / X-Forwarded-Proto. Use "*" ONLY when you trust the
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# network (never directly on the internet). Default matches uvicorn.
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forwarded_allow_ips: str = "127.0.0.1"
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# How long to wait for in-flight requests / scheduler jobs before force
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# killing on SIGTERM.
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graceful_shutdown_seconds: int = 60
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anthropic_api_key: str = ""
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ai_model: str = "claude-sonnet-4-20250514"
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ai_max_tokens: int = 1024
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@@ -49,9 +57,6 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
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"""Path to frontend static files. Set to serve SvelteKit build via FastAPI (e.g. /app/static in Docker)."""
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# --- Logging ---
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# Boot-time logging configuration. DB AppSetting rows (``log_level`` /
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# ``log_levels`` / ``log_format``) override these after startup, letting
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# operators adjust levels from the settings UI without a restart.
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log_level: str = "INFO"
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"""Root log level for the app loggers (``DEBUG``/``INFO``/``WARNING``/``ERROR``)."""
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@@ -61,8 +66,43 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
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log_levels: str = ""
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"""Comma-separated per-module overrides, e.g. ``notify_bridge_core.notifications.telegram.client=DEBUG,sqlalchemy.engine=INFO``."""
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# --- Retention ---
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event_log_retention_days: int = 30
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"""Days of event_log history to retain. 0 disables the retention job."""
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model_config = {"env_prefix": "NOTIFY_BRIDGE_"}
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def model_post_init(self, __context: Any) -> None:
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if self.secret_key in _FORBIDDEN_SECRETS:
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raise ValueError(
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"SECURITY: Refusing to start with a known/default secret_key. "
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"Set NOTIFY_BRIDGE_SECRET_KEY to a random value (>=32 bytes) "
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"before starting the server."
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)
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if len(self.secret_key) < 32:
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raise ValueError(
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"SECURITY: NOTIFY_BRIDGE_SECRET_KEY must be at least 32 characters."
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)
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origins = [o.strip() for o in self.cors_allowed_origins.split(",") if o.strip()]
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if "*" in origins:
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raise ValueError(
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"SECURITY: wildcard '*' is not allowed in CORS origins when credentials are enabled."
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)
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for origin in origins:
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parsed = urlparse(origin)
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if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.netloc:
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raise ValueError(
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f"CORS origin {origin!r} is invalid — must include scheme (http/https) and host."
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)
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if self.access_token_expire_minutes <= 0:
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raise ValueError("access_token_expire_minutes must be > 0")
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if self.refresh_token_expire_days <= 0:
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raise ValueError("refresh_token_expire_days must be > 0")
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if not (1 <= self.port <= 65535):
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raise ValueError("port must be in range 1..65535")
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if self.event_log_retention_days < 0:
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raise ValueError("event_log_retention_days must be >= 0")
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@property
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def effective_database_url(self) -> str:
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if self.database_url:
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