feat: security hardening — SSRF guard, template sandbox timeout, webhook log prune, auth & backup polish

- Add outbound URL validation (SSRF) for webhook/Discord/Slack/ntfy/Matrix dispatch
- Template renderer: input/output caps and thread-based render timeout
- Webhook log filter: strip Authorization/signature/token-like headers; atomic prune
- Auth/JWT/backup/config tightening; misc frontend UX fixes

packages/core/src/notify_bridge_core/notifications/dispatcher.py

@@ -12,6 +12,19 @@ import aiohttp
 from notify_bridge_core.models.events import ServiceEvent
 from notify_bridge_core.templates.context import build_template_context
 from notify_bridge_core.templates.renderer import render_template
+from .ssrf import UnsafeURLError, validate_outbound_url
+
+_HTTP_TIMEOUT = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=30)
+
+
+def _new_session() -> aiohttp.ClientSession:
+    """Per-dispatch aiohttp session with a sane default timeout.
+
+    We still open a short-lived session per dispatch (connection reuse across
+    dispatches lives in the server-side shared session), but we always attach
+    a total timeout so a hung peer cannot wedge the task forever.
+    """
+    return aiohttp.ClientSession(timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT)
 
 from .receiver import (
     Receiver,
@@ -176,7 +189,7 @@ class NotificationDispatcher:
                 assets.append(asset_entry)
 
         results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
+        async with _new_session() as session:
             client = TelegramClient(
                 session, bot_token,
                 url_cache=self._url_cache,
@@ -226,11 +239,16 @@ class NotificationDispatcher:
             return {"success": False, "error": "No receivers configured"}
 
         results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
+        async with _new_session() as session:
             for receiver in target.receivers:
                 if not isinstance(receiver, WebhookReceiver) or not receiver.url:
                     results.append({"success": False, "error": "Invalid webhook receiver"})
                     continue
+                try:
+                    validate_outbound_url(receiver.url)
+                except UnsafeURLError as err:
+                    results.append({"success": False, "error": f"Unsafe URL: {err}"})
+                    continue
                 message = self._message_for_receiver(receiver, default_message, event, target)
                 payload = {
                     "message": message,
@@ -295,12 +313,17 @@ class NotificationDispatcher:
         username = target.config.get("username")
 
         results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
+        async with _new_session() as session:
             client = DiscordClient(session)
             for receiver in target.receivers:
                 if not isinstance(receiver, DiscordReceiver) or not receiver.webhook_url:
                     results.append({"success": False, "error": "Invalid discord receiver"})
                     continue
+                try:
+                    validate_outbound_url(receiver.webhook_url)
+                except UnsafeURLError as err:
+                    results.append({"success": False, "error": f"Unsafe URL: {err}"})
+                    continue
                 message = self._message_for_receiver(receiver, default_message, event, target)
                 results.append(await client.send(receiver.webhook_url, message, username=username))
 
@@ -316,12 +339,17 @@ class NotificationDispatcher:
         username = target.config.get("username")
 
         results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
+        async with _new_session() as session:
             client = SlackClient(session)
             for receiver in target.receivers:
                 if not isinstance(receiver, SlackReceiver) or not receiver.webhook_url:
                     results.append({"success": False, "error": "Invalid slack receiver"})
                     continue
+                try:
+                    validate_outbound_url(receiver.webhook_url)
+                except UnsafeURLError as err:
+                    results.append({"success": False, "error": f"Unsafe URL: {err}"})
+                    continue
                 message = self._message_for_receiver(receiver, default_message, event, target)
                 results.append(await client.send(receiver.webhook_url, message, username=username))
 
@@ -336,11 +364,15 @@ class NotificationDispatcher:
         auth_token = target.config.get("auth_token")
         if not target.receivers:
             return {"success": False, "error": "No receivers configured"}
+        try:
+            validate_outbound_url(server_url)
+        except UnsafeURLError as err:
+            return {"success": False, "error": f"Unsafe ntfy server_url: {err}"}
 
         title = f"{event.event_type.value}: {event.collection_name}"
 
         results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
+        async with _new_session() as session:
             client = NtfyClient(session)
             for receiver in target.receivers:
                 if not isinstance(receiver, NtfyReceiver) or not receiver.topic:
@@ -363,12 +395,16 @@ class NotificationDispatcher:
         access_token = target.config.get("access_token")
         if not homeserver or not access_token:
             return {"success": False, "error": "Missing Matrix homeserver_url or access_token"}
+        try:
+            validate_outbound_url(homeserver)
+        except UnsafeURLError as err:
+            return {"success": False, "error": f"Unsafe matrix homeserver_url: {err}"}
 
         if not target.receivers:
             return {"success": False, "error": "No receivers configured"}
 
         results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
+        async with _new_session() as session:
             client = MatrixClient(session, homeserver, access_token)
             for receiver in target.receivers:
                 if not isinstance(receiver, MatrixReceiver) or not receiver.room_id:

packages/core/src/notify_bridge_core/notifications/ssrf.py

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+"""Outbound URL validation to mitigate SSRF attacks.
+
+User-controlled URLs (provider `url`, webhook target `url`, shared-link
+base URLs, image downloads) must be validated before any HTTP request is
+issued. This module rejects schemes other than http/https and blocks
+destinations that resolve to private, loopback, link-local, or unspecified
+address ranges.
+
+Set ``NOTIFY_BRIDGE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=1`` in the environment for
+development against localhost services.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import os
+import socket
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+_ALLOW_PRIVATE = os.environ.get("NOTIFY_BRIDGE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS") == "1"
+_ALLOWED_SCHEMES = {"http", "https"}
+
+
+class UnsafeURLError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when a URL targets a disallowed network destination."""
+
+
+def _is_blocked_ip(ip: ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address) -> bool:
+    return (
+        ip.is_private
+        or ip.is_loopback
+        or ip.is_link_local
+        or ip.is_multicast
+        or ip.is_reserved
+        or ip.is_unspecified
+    )
+
+
+def validate_outbound_url(url: str) -> str:
+    """Validate ``url`` is safe to fetch; returns the URL on success.
+
+    Raises :class:`UnsafeURLError` when the scheme, host, or resolved IP
+    is not allowed. In development (``NOTIFY_BRIDGE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=1``)
+    private addresses are permitted but the scheme check still applies.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(url, str) or not url:
+        raise UnsafeURLError("URL is empty")
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    if parsed.scheme not in _ALLOWED_SCHEMES:
+        raise UnsafeURLError(f"Scheme '{parsed.scheme}' not allowed")
+    host = parsed.hostname
+    if not host:
+        raise UnsafeURLError("URL has no host")
+
+    if _ALLOW_PRIVATE:
+        return url
+
+    # Literal IP host
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+        if _is_blocked_ip(ip):
+            raise UnsafeURLError(f"Host {host} is in a blocked range")
+        return url
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+
+    # Hostname — resolve and reject if any resolution is in a blocked range.
+    try:
+        infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, None)
+    except socket.gaierror as exc:
+        raise UnsafeURLError(f"DNS resolution failed for {host}") from exc
+    for info in infos:
+        sockaddr = info[4]
+        try:
+            ip = ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0])
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+        if _is_blocked_ip(ip):
+            raise UnsafeURLError(f"Host {host} resolves to blocked address {ip}")
+    return url

packages/core/src/notify_bridge_core/notifications/webhook/client.py

@@ -7,8 +7,12 @@ from typing import Any
 
 import aiohttp
 
+from ..ssrf import UnsafeURLError, validate_outbound_url
+
 _LOGGER = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
+_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=30)
+
 
 class WebhookClient:
     """Send JSON payloads to a webhook URL."""
@@ -19,11 +23,16 @@ class WebhookClient:
         self._headers = headers or {}
 
     async def send(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            validate_outbound_url(self._url)
+        except UnsafeURLError as err:
+            return {"success": False, "error": f"Unsafe URL: {err}"}
         try:
             async with self._session.post(
                 self._url,
                 json=payload,
                 headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", **self._headers},
+                timeout=_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
             ) as response:
                 if 200 <= response.status < 300:
                     return {"success": True, "status_code": response.status}

packages/core/src/notify_bridge_core/providers/webhook/event_parser.py

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ def _compile_jsonpath(expression: str) -> Any | None:
         return _JSONPATH_CACHE[expression]
     try:
         compiled = jsonpath_parse(expression)
-    except (JsonPathParserError, Exception) as exc:
+    except (JsonPathParserError, ValueError, TypeError, AttributeError) as exc:
         _LOGGER.warning("Invalid JSONPath expression '%s': %s", expression, exc)
         compiled = None
     _JSONPATH_CACHE[expression] = compiled
@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ def parse_webhook(
     Returns:
         A ServiceEvent, or None if parsing fails critically.
     """
+    # Defensive: upstream callers should pass a dict, but tolerate non-dict
+    # payloads by coercing to an empty mapping rather than raising.
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        payload = {}
     # Build a combined data dict so JSONPath can reference headers too
     data: dict[str, Any] = {**payload}
     if headers:

packages/core/src/notify_bridge_core/templates/renderer.py

@@ -1,8 +1,18 @@
-"""Template rendering engine using Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment."""
+"""Template rendering engine using Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment.
+
+Hardening applied:
+
+* SandboxedEnvironment with autoescape for attribute/method isolation.
+* Input length cap to short-circuit pathological templates before parsing.
+* Output length cap via a custom stream check to prevent memory blow-ups.
+* Cooperative time budget via a thread-based watchdog -- a runaway template
+  (``{% for i in range(10**8) %}``) is interrupted instead of wedging the worker.
+"""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import logging
+import threading
 from typing import Any
 
 import jinja2
@@ -10,16 +20,75 @@ from jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment
 
 _LOGGER = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
+MAX_TEMPLATE_LEN = 64 * 1024        # 64 KiB source
+MAX_OUTPUT_LEN = 256 * 1024         # 256 KiB rendered
+RENDER_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 2.0
+
 _env = SandboxedEnvironment(autoescape=True)
 
 
+class TemplateRenderTimeout(jinja2.TemplateError):
+    """Raised when a template exceeds the configured render budget."""
+
+
+def _render_with_timeout(template: jinja2.Template, context: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Render `template` in a worker thread with a hard timeout.
+
+    Jinja2 has no built-in timeout; we run the render in a daemon thread and
+    join with a deadline. If the deadline is exceeded we raise and let the
+    thread die with the process -- accepted trade-off for a bounded-budget
+    admin-authored template.
+    """
+    result: dict[str, Any] = {}
+
+    def _run() -> None:
+        try:
+            result["value"] = template.render(**context)
+        except BaseException as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - forward to caller
+            result["error"] = exc
+
+    worker = threading.Thread(target=_run, daemon=True)
+    worker.start()
+    worker.join(RENDER_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+    if worker.is_alive():
+        raise TemplateRenderTimeout(
+            f"Template render exceeded {RENDER_TIMEOUT_SECONDS}s budget"
+        )
+    if "error" in result:
+        raise result["error"]
+    return result.get("value", "")
+
+
 def render_template(template_str: str, context: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
     """Render a Jinja2 template string with the given context.
 
-    Falls back to returning the raw template on error.
+    Enforces source length, output length, and wall-clock time caps.
+    Returns a placeholder on any failure so callers never see a partial render.
     """
+    if not isinstance(template_str, str):
+        return ""
+    if len(template_str) > MAX_TEMPLATE_LEN:
+        _LOGGER.warning(
+            "Template source exceeds %d chars (%d); refusing to render",
+            MAX_TEMPLATE_LEN, len(template_str),
+        )
+        return "[Template too large]"
     try:
-        return _env.from_string(template_str).render(**context)
+        compiled = _env.from_string(template_str)
+        output = _render_with_timeout(compiled, context)
+    except TemplateRenderTimeout as e:
+        _LOGGER.error("Template render timeout: %s", e)
+        return "[Template render timeout]"
     except jinja2.TemplateError as e:
         _LOGGER.error("Template render error: %s", e)
         return "[Template rendering error]"
+    except Exception as e:  # sandbox guarded — log and fall back safely
+        _LOGGER.error("Unexpected template error: %s", e, exc_info=True)
+        return "[Template rendering error]"
+    if len(output) > MAX_OUTPUT_LEN:
+        _LOGGER.warning(
+            "Template output truncated from %d to %d bytes",
+            len(output), MAX_OUTPUT_LEN,
+        )
+        return output[:MAX_OUTPUT_LEN] + "\n[truncated]"
+    return output

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/api/backup.py

@@ -31,6 +31,23 @@ def _backup_dir():
     return app_config.data_dir / "backups"
 
 
+def _resolve_backup_file(filename: str):
+    """Validate filename and resolve to a path strictly inside the backup dir."""
+    if not filename.startswith("backup-") or not filename.endswith(".json"):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup file not found")
+    if "/" in filename or "\\" in filename or ".." in filename or "\x00" in filename:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup file not found")
+    base = _backup_dir().resolve()
+    candidate = (base / filename).resolve()
+    try:
+        candidate.relative_to(base)
+    except ValueError:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup file not found")
+    if not candidate.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup file not found")
+    return candidate
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Export
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -194,9 +211,7 @@ async def download_backup_file(
     user: User = Depends(require_admin),
 ):
     """Download a specific backup file."""
-    filepath = _backup_dir() / filename
-    if not filepath.is_file() or not filename.startswith("backup-"):
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup file not found")
+    filepath = _resolve_backup_file(filename)
 
     try:
         content = json.loads(filepath.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
@@ -215,9 +230,6 @@ async def delete_backup_file(
     user: User = Depends(require_admin),
 ):
     """Delete a specific backup file."""
-    filepath = _backup_dir() / filename
-    if not filepath.is_file() or not filename.startswith("backup-"):
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup file not found")
-
+    filepath = _resolve_backup_file(filename)
     filepath.unlink()
     return {"deleted": filename}

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/api/webhooks.py

@@ -350,12 +350,29 @@ def _verify_generic_webhook_auth(
     return False
 
 
+_SENSITIVE_HEADER_SUBSTR = (
+    "token", "auth", "key", "secret", "signature", "password", "credential",
+    "cookie", "x-api", "x-hub-signature",
+)
+
+
+def _is_sensitive_header(name: str) -> bool:
+    n = name.lower()
+    return any(s in n for s in _SENSITIVE_HEADER_SUBSTR)
+
+
 def _filter_headers(raw_headers: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Keep only safe headers for logging (no Authorization)."""
+    """Keep only safe headers for logging (strip Authorization, signatures, tokens).
+
+    Allowlist base set of known-safe headers, accept X-* only if they do not
+    match any sensitive substring (token/auth/key/secret/signature/...).
+    """
     safe: dict[str, str] = {}
     for k, v in raw_headers.items():
         kl = k.lower()
-        if kl in ("content-type", "user-agent") or kl.startswith("x-"):
+        if _is_sensitive_header(kl):
+            continue
+        if kl in ("content-type", "user-agent", "content-length", "accept") or kl.startswith("x-"):
             safe[k] = v
     return safe
 
@@ -384,26 +401,26 @@ async def _save_webhook_log(
             error_message=error_message,
         ))
         await session.flush()
-        count_result = await session.exec(
-            select(func.count(WebhookPayloadLog.id))
+        # Atomic prune: DELETE anything for this provider outside the newest
+        # max_count rows. Avoids the COUNT -> SELECT -> DELETE race.
+        keep_subq = (
+            select(WebhookPayloadLog.id)
             .where(WebhookPayloadLog.provider_id == provider_id)
+            .order_by(WebhookPayloadLog.created_at.desc(), WebhookPayloadLog.id.desc())
+            .limit(max_count)
+            .subquery()
+        )
+        await session.execute(
+            sa_delete(WebhookPayloadLog)
+            .where(WebhookPayloadLog.provider_id == provider_id)
+            .where(~WebhookPayloadLog.id.in_(select(keep_subq.c.id)))
         )
-        total = count_result.one()
-        if total > max_count:
-            oldest = await session.exec(
-                select(WebhookPayloadLog.id)
-                .where(WebhookPayloadLog.provider_id == provider_id)
-                .order_by(WebhookPayloadLog.created_at.asc())
-                .limit(total - max_count)
-            )
-            ids_to_delete = list(oldest.all())
-            if ids_to_delete:
-                await session.execute(
-                    sa_delete(WebhookPayloadLog)
-                    .where(WebhookPayloadLog.id.in_(ids_to_delete))
-                )
     except Exception:
         _LOGGER.warning("Failed to save webhook payload log for provider %d", provider_id, exc_info=True)
+        try:
+            await session.rollback()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
 
 
 @router.post("/webhook/{token}")
@@ -436,6 +453,8 @@ async def generic_webhook(token: str, request: Request):
     # Parse JSON payload
     try:
         payload = await request.json()
+        if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+            raise ValueError("Payload must be a JSON object")
     except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
         if store_payloads:
             async with AsyncSession(get_engine()) as log_session:

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/auth/dependencies.py

@@ -22,12 +22,15 @@ async def get_current_user(
         if payload.get("type") != "access":
             raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid token type")
         user_id = int(payload["sub"])
+        token_version = int(payload.get("ver", 1))
     except (jwt.PyJWTError, KeyError, ValueError) as exc:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid or expired token") from exc
 
     user = await session.get(User, user_id)
     if user is None:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="User not found")
+    if token_version != user.token_version:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Token revoked")
     return user
 
 

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/auth/jwt.py

@@ -9,15 +9,26 @@ from ..config import settings
 ALGORITHM = "HS256"
 
 
-def create_access_token(user_id: int, role: str) -> str:
+def create_access_token(user_id: int, role: str, token_version: int = 1) -> str:
     expire = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(minutes=settings.access_token_expire_minutes)
-    payload = {"sub": str(user_id), "role": role, "type": "access", "exp": expire}
+    payload = {
+        "sub": str(user_id),
+        "role": role,
+        "type": "access",
+        "ver": token_version,
+        "exp": expire,
+    }
     return jwt.encode(payload, settings.secret_key, algorithm=ALGORITHM)
 
 
-def create_refresh_token(user_id: int) -> str:
+def create_refresh_token(user_id: int, token_version: int = 1) -> str:
     expire = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=settings.refresh_token_expire_days)
-    payload = {"sub": str(user_id), "type": "refresh", "exp": expire}
+    payload = {
+        "sub": str(user_id),
+        "type": "refresh",
+        "ver": token_version,
+        "exp": expire,
+    }
     return jwt.encode(payload, settings.secret_key, algorithm=ALGORITHM)
 
 

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/auth/routes.py

@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ async def setup(request: Request, body: SetupRequest, session: AsyncSession = De
     await session.refresh(user)
 
     return TokenResponse(
-        access_token=create_access_token(user.id, user.role),
-        refresh_token=create_refresh_token(user.id),
+        access_token=create_access_token(user.id, user.role, user.token_version),
+        refresh_token=create_refresh_token(user.id, user.token_version),
     )
 
 
@@ -83,29 +83,33 @@ async def login(request: Request, body: LoginRequest, session: AsyncSession = De
         raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid username or password")
 
     return TokenResponse(
-        access_token=create_access_token(user.id, user.role),
-        refresh_token=create_refresh_token(user.id),
+        access_token=create_access_token(user.id, user.role, user.token_version),
+        refresh_token=create_refresh_token(user.id, user.token_version),
     )
 
 
 @router.post("/refresh", response_model=TokenResponse)
-async def refresh(body: RefreshRequest, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)):
+@limiter.limit("10/minute")
+async def refresh(request: Request, body: RefreshRequest, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)):
     import jwt as pyjwt
     try:
         payload = decode_token(body.refresh_token)
         if payload.get("type") != "refresh":
             raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid token type")
         user_id = int(payload["sub"])
+        token_version = int(payload.get("ver", 1))
     except (pyjwt.PyJWTError, KeyError, ValueError) as exc:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid refresh token") from exc
 
     user = await session.get(User, user_id)
     if not user:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="User not found")
+    if token_version != user.token_version:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Refresh token revoked")
 
     return TokenResponse(
-        access_token=create_access_token(user.id, user.role),
-        refresh_token=create_refresh_token(user.id),
+        access_token=create_access_token(user.id, user.role, user.token_version),
+        refresh_token=create_refresh_token(user.id, user.token_version),
     )
 
 
@@ -130,6 +134,7 @@ async def change_password(
     if len(body.new_password) < 8:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="New password must be at least 8 characters")
     user.hashed_password = _hash_password(body.new_password)
+    user.token_version = (user.token_version or 1) + 1
     session.add(user)
     await session.commit()
     return {"success": True}

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/config.py

@@ -14,10 +14,19 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     secret_key: str = "change-me-in-production"
 
     def model_post_init(self, __context: Any) -> None:
-        if self.secret_key == "change-me-in-production" and not self.debug:
+        if self.secret_key == "change-me-in-production":
             raise ValueError(
-                "SECURITY: Cannot start with default secret_key in production. "
-                "Set NOTIFY_BRIDGE_SECRET_KEY environment variable."
+                "SECURITY: Refusing to start with the default secret_key. "
+                "Set NOTIFY_BRIDGE_SECRET_KEY to a random value (>=32 bytes) "
+                "before starting the server (debug mode included)."
+            )
+        if len(self.secret_key) < 32:
+            raise ValueError(
+                "SECURITY: NOTIFY_BRIDGE_SECRET_KEY must be at least 32 characters."
+            )
+        if "*" in self.cors_allowed_origins.split(","):
+            raise ValueError(
+                "SECURITY: wildcard '*' is not allowed in CORS origins when credentials are enabled."
             )
 
     access_token_expire_minutes: int = 60

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/database/migrations.py

@@ -18,8 +18,23 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 # Helpers
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
+_IDENT_RE = __import__("re").compile(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$")
+
+
+def _assert_ident(ident: str, kind: str = "identifier") -> str:
+    """Guard against SQL injection in dynamically interpolated identifiers.
+
+    All table/column names flow through here before being embedded into f-strings,
+    so attacker-controlled values cannot break out even if they reach this layer.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(ident, str) or not _IDENT_RE.match(ident):
+        raise ValueError(f"Unsafe {kind}: {ident!r}")
+    return ident
+
+
 async def _has_column(conn, table: str, column: str) -> bool:
     """Check if a column exists in a SQLite table."""
+    _assert_ident(table, "table")
     cols = await conn.run_sync(
         lambda sync_conn: [
             row[1]
@@ -1187,3 +1202,15 @@ async def migrate_notification_slot_locale(engine: AsyncEngine) -> None:
                     "Merged system notification template configs for %s (EN=%d, RU=%d) into %d",
                     provider_type, en_id, ru_id, en_id,
                 )
+
+
+async def migrate_user_token_version(engine: AsyncEngine) -> None:
+    """Add token_version column to user for JWT revocation on password change."""
+    async with engine.begin() as conn:
+        if not await _has_table(conn, "user"):
+            return
+        if not await _has_column(conn, "user", "token_version"):
+            await conn.execute(
+                text("ALTER TABLE user ADD COLUMN token_version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1")
+            )
+            logger.info("Added token_version column to user table")

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/database/models.py

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ class User(SQLModel, table=True):
     username: str = Field(index=True, unique=True)
     hashed_password: str
     role: str = Field(default="user")
+    token_version: int = Field(default=1)
     created_at: datetime = Field(default_factory=_utcnow)
 
 

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/main.py

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
     await init_db()
     # Run data migrations (idempotent)
     from .database.engine import get_engine
-    from .database.migrations import migrate_schema, migrate_tracker_targets, migrate_entity_refactor, migrate_template_slots, migrate_target_receivers, migrate_template_locale, migrate_receivers_from_config, migrate_command_slot_locale, migrate_notification_slot_locale
+    from .database.migrations import migrate_schema, migrate_tracker_targets, migrate_entity_refactor, migrate_template_slots, migrate_target_receivers, migrate_template_locale, migrate_receivers_from_config, migrate_command_slot_locale, migrate_notification_slot_locale, migrate_user_token_version
     engine = get_engine()
     await migrate_schema(engine)
     await migrate_tracker_targets(engine)
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
     await migrate_receivers_from_config(engine)
     await migrate_command_slot_locale(engine)
     await migrate_notification_slot_locale(engine)
+    await migrate_user_token_version(engine)
     from .database.seeds import seed_all
     await seed_all()
     # Configure webhook secret from DB setting (falls back to env var)

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/services/backup_service.py

@@ -34,6 +34,44 @@ _LOGGER = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 # Fields to skip when serializing TrackingConfig into the generic `fields` dict
 _TRACKING_SKIP = frozenset(("id", "user_id", "provider_type", "name", "icon", "created_at"))
 
+# Import-time config hardening limits
+_MAX_CONFIG_DEPTH = 6
+_MAX_CONFIG_KEYS = 200
+_MAX_STRING_LEN = 8192
+
+
+def _sanitize_config(value: Any, depth: int = 0) -> Any:
+    """Clamp imported config values to safe shapes before persistence.
+
+    Rejects anything that is not a JSON-compatible primitive/container, truncates
+    over-long strings, and caps dict/list sizes. Returns a defensively-copied
+    structure; the caller should never see attacker-controlled references.
+    """
+    if depth > _MAX_CONFIG_DEPTH:
+        raise ValueError("Config nesting exceeds maximum depth")
+    if value is None or isinstance(value, bool):
+        return value
+    if isinstance(value, (int, float)):
+        return value
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return value[:_MAX_STRING_LEN]
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        if len(value) > _MAX_CONFIG_KEYS:
+            raise ValueError("Config list exceeds maximum length")
+        return [_sanitize_config(v, depth + 1) for v in value]
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        if len(value) > _MAX_CONFIG_KEYS:
+            raise ValueError("Config dict exceeds maximum key count")
+        cleaned: dict[str, Any] = {}
+        for k, v in value.items():
+            if not isinstance(k, str):
+                raise ValueError("Config keys must be strings")
+            if len(k) > 128:
+                raise ValueError(f"Config key too long: {k[:40]}...")
+            cleaned[k] = _sanitize_config(v, depth + 1)
+        return cleaned
+    raise ValueError(f"Unsupported config value type: {type(value).__name__}")
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Export
@@ -530,9 +568,14 @@ async def import_backup(
             )
             if name is None:
                 continue
+            try:
+                safe_cfg = _sanitize_config(p.config or {})
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                result.warnings.append(f"Skipped provider '{p.name}': {exc}")
+                continue
             new_p = ServiceProvider(
                 user_id=user_id, type=p.type, name=name,
-                icon=p.icon, config=p.config,
+                icon=p.icon, config=safe_cfg,
             )
             session.add(new_p)
             await session.flush()
@@ -635,17 +678,27 @@ async def import_backup(
             )
             if name is None:
                 continue
+            try:
+                safe_tgt_cfg = _sanitize_config(tgt.config or {})
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                result.warnings.append(f"Skipped target '{tgt.name}': {exc}")
+                continue
             new_tgt = NotificationTarget(
                 user_id=user_id, type=tgt.type, name=name,
-                icon=tgt.icon, config=tgt.config,
+                icon=tgt.icon, config=safe_tgt_cfg,
                 chat_action=tgt.chat_action,
             )
             session.add(new_tgt)
             await session.flush()
             id_map["targets"][tgt.id] = new_tgt.id
             for r in tgt.receivers:
+                try:
+                    safe_r_cfg = _sanitize_config(r.config or {})
+                except ValueError as exc:
+                    result.warnings.append(f"Skipped receiver in '{tgt.name}': {exc}")
+                    continue
                 session.add(TargetReceiver(
-                    target_id=new_tgt.id, name=r.name, config=r.config,
+                    target_id=new_tgt.id, name=r.name, config=safe_r_cfg,
                     receiver_key=r.receiver_key, locale=r.locale,
                     enabled=r.enabled,
                 ))

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/services/dispatch_helpers.py

@@ -249,6 +249,22 @@ async def load_link_data(
             event_key = s.slot_name.removeprefix("message_") if s.slot_name.startswith("message_") else s.slot_name
             slots_by_config.setdefault(s.config_id, {}).setdefault(event_key, {})[s.locale] = s.template
 
+    # Pre-resolve broadcast children in one query to avoid N+1 per-child fetches
+    broadcast_child_ids: set[int] = set()
+    for tt in active_links:
+        target = target_map.get(tt.target_id)
+        if target and target.type == "broadcast":
+            disabled_ids = set(target.config.get("disabled_child_ids", []))
+            for cid in target.config.get("child_target_ids", []):
+                if cid not in disabled_ids:
+                    broadcast_child_ids.add(cid)
+    child_target_map: dict[int, NotificationTarget] = {}
+    if broadcast_child_ids:
+        child_rows = await session.exec(
+            select(NotificationTarget).where(NotificationTarget.id.in_(broadcast_child_ids))
+        )
+        child_target_map = {t.id: t for t in child_rows.all()}
+
     link_data: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
     for tt in active_links:
         target = target_map.get(tt.target_id)
@@ -262,14 +278,13 @@ async def load_link_data(
         template_config = tmpl_map.get(tmpl_id) if tmpl_id else None
         template_slots = slots_by_config.get(template_config.id) if template_config else None
 
-        # Broadcast target: expand into child targets
+        # Broadcast target: expand into child targets (pre-loaded above)
         if target.type == "broadcast":
-            child_ids = target.config.get("child_target_ids", [])
             disabled_ids = set(target.config.get("disabled_child_ids", []))
-            for child_id in child_ids:
+            for child_id in target.config.get("child_target_ids", []):
                 if child_id in disabled_ids:
                     continue
-                child_target = await session.get(NotificationTarget, child_id)
+                child_target = child_target_map.get(child_id)
                 if not child_target or child_target.type == "broadcast":
                     continue
                 resolved = await _resolve_target(session, child_target)