feat: security hardening — SSRF guard, template sandbox timeout, webhook log prune, auth & backup polish

- Add outbound URL validation (SSRF) for webhook/Discord/Slack/ntfy/Matrix dispatch
- Template renderer: input/output caps and thread-based render timeout
- Webhook log filter: strip Authorization/signature/token-like headers; atomic prune
- Auth/JWT/backup/config tightening; misc frontend UX fixes

packages/server/src/notify_bridge_server/api/webhooks.py

@@ -350,12 +350,29 @@ def _verify_generic_webhook_auth(
     return False
 
 
+_SENSITIVE_HEADER_SUBSTR = (
+    "token", "auth", "key", "secret", "signature", "password", "credential",
+    "cookie", "x-api", "x-hub-signature",
+)
+
+
+def _is_sensitive_header(name: str) -> bool:
+    n = name.lower()
+    return any(s in n for s in _SENSITIVE_HEADER_SUBSTR)
+
+
 def _filter_headers(raw_headers: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Keep only safe headers for logging (no Authorization)."""
+    """Keep only safe headers for logging (strip Authorization, signatures, tokens).
+
+    Allowlist base set of known-safe headers, accept X-* only if they do not
+    match any sensitive substring (token/auth/key/secret/signature/...).
+    """
     safe: dict[str, str] = {}
     for k, v in raw_headers.items():
         kl = k.lower()
-        if kl in ("content-type", "user-agent") or kl.startswith("x-"):
+        if _is_sensitive_header(kl):
+            continue
+        if kl in ("content-type", "user-agent", "content-length", "accept") or kl.startswith("x-"):
             safe[k] = v
     return safe
 
@@ -384,26 +401,26 @@ async def _save_webhook_log(
             error_message=error_message,
         ))
         await session.flush()
-        count_result = await session.exec(
-            select(func.count(WebhookPayloadLog.id))
+        # Atomic prune: DELETE anything for this provider outside the newest
+        # max_count rows. Avoids the COUNT -> SELECT -> DELETE race.
+        keep_subq = (
+            select(WebhookPayloadLog.id)
             .where(WebhookPayloadLog.provider_id == provider_id)
+            .order_by(WebhookPayloadLog.created_at.desc(), WebhookPayloadLog.id.desc())
+            .limit(max_count)
+            .subquery()
+        )
+        await session.execute(
+            sa_delete(WebhookPayloadLog)
+            .where(WebhookPayloadLog.provider_id == provider_id)
+            .where(~WebhookPayloadLog.id.in_(select(keep_subq.c.id)))
         )
-        total = count_result.one()
-        if total > max_count:
-            oldest = await session.exec(
-                select(WebhookPayloadLog.id)
-                .where(WebhookPayloadLog.provider_id == provider_id)
-                .order_by(WebhookPayloadLog.created_at.asc())
-                .limit(total - max_count)
-            )
-            ids_to_delete = list(oldest.all())
-            if ids_to_delete:
-                await session.execute(
-                    sa_delete(WebhookPayloadLog)
-                    .where(WebhookPayloadLog.id.in_(ids_to_delete))
-                )
     except Exception:
         _LOGGER.warning("Failed to save webhook payload log for provider %d", provider_id, exc_info=True)
+        try:
+            await session.rollback()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
 
 
 @router.post("/webhook/{token}")
@@ -436,6 +453,8 @@ async def generic_webhook(token: str, request: Request):
     # Parse JSON payload
     try:
         payload = await request.json()
+        if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+            raise ValueError("Payload must be a JSON object")
     except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
         if store_payloads:
             async with AsyncSession(get_engine()) as log_session: