alexei.dolgolyov
920920bc67
Security - SSRF: async DNS resolver; allow_redirects=False on all outbound clients; matrix homeserver_url validated on create/update/test; update_provider and email_bot merge incoming config and reject ***-masked secrets. - Auth: bcrypt offloaded to asyncio.to_thread; JWT now carries iss/aud + leeway and rejects missing claims; setup TOCTOU closed inside a transaction; rate limits extended (default 600/min, 10/min on password change, 30/min on needs-setup); constant-time login to prevent username enumeration. - Config: rejects known dev secret keys; validates CORS origin schemes, port range, token lifetimes. - Webhook handlers stream-read body with a 1 MiB cap; Discord 429 retries bounded (3 attempts, Retry-After capped at 60 s). - CSP + HSTS added to SecurityHeadersMiddleware. Async / runtime - SQLite engine: WAL, synchronous=NORMAL, foreign_keys=ON, busy_timeout, pool_pre_ping, dispose on shutdown. - Lifespan shutdown now stops scheduler before closing HTTP session and disposing the engine. - Shared aiohttp session locked against concurrent first-caller races; core NotificationDispatcher accepts and reuses it. - Storage and scheduled backup writes wrapped in asyncio.to_thread. - NUT client writes bounded by asyncio.wait_for. - Telegram poller switched from 3 s short-poll to 30 s interval + 25 s long-poll (~10x fewer API calls). Database - New performance-indexes migration covers every FK/owner column and hot-path composite (notification_tracker(provider_id, enabled); event_log(user_id, created_at DESC); webhook_payload_log(provider_id, created_at DESC); action_execution(action_id, started_at DESC)). - New schema_version table for future upgrade gating. - __system__ placeholder user (id=0) seeded so user_id=0 system defaults satisfy the newly enforced FK; filtered out of /auth/needs-setup, /api/users, and setup. - list_notification_trackers rewritten to batched loads (was 1+N+N*M). - Retention job extended to event_log, webhook_payload_log, and action_execution; retention days exposed as a setting. Scheduler - AsyncIOScheduler job_defaults: coalesce, misfire_grace_time=300, max_instances=1. Ops - uvicorn runs with proxy_headers, forwarded_allow_ips, timeout_graceful_shutdown; access log suppressed in non-debug. - FastAPI version string now reads from importlib.metadata. - New /api/ready endpoint separate from /api/health. - docker-compose drops the ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=1 default, adds mem/cpu/pid limits, read_only + tmpfs, cap_drop:ALL, no-new-privileges; healthcheck targets /api/ready. - CI now runs on push/PR with backend pytest, frontend svelte-check + build, and a non-push image build; release workflow gated on tests, publishes immutable sha-<commit> image tag, adds Trivy scan. Tests - New packages/server/tests/ with 29 passing tests: config validation, JWT round-trip + aud/alg=none rejection, SSRF scheme and private-range enforcement (sync + async), Discord bounded retry, and a lifespan-level /api/health + /api/ready smoke check. - Renamed the misnamed services/test_dispatch.py to manual_dispatch.py so pytest never auto-collects production code. Frontend - /login now redirects already-authenticated users to /, shows a distinct 'backend unreachable' banner (en/ru) when /auth/needs-setup fails.
60 lines
1.7 KiB
Python
60 lines
1.7 KiB
Python
"""SSRF guard regression tests."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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from notify_bridge_core.notifications.ssrf import (
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UnsafeURLError,
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avalidate_outbound_url,
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validate_outbound_url,
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)
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class TestScheme:
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def test_rejects_file_scheme(self) -> None:
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with pytest.raises(UnsafeURLError):
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validate_outbound_url("file:///etc/passwd")
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def test_rejects_gopher(self) -> None:
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with pytest.raises(UnsafeURLError):
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validate_outbound_url("gopher://example.com/")
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def test_accepts_https(self) -> None:
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# A well-known public host — validated via real DNS so this test is
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# skipped when offline.
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try:
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validate_outbound_url("https://example.com/")
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except UnsafeURLError as err:
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if "DNS" in str(err):
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pytest.skip("No DNS in test environment")
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raise
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class TestBlockedRanges:
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"url",
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[
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"http://127.0.0.1/",
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"http://10.0.0.1/",
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"http://192.168.1.1/",
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"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
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"http://[::1]/",
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],
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)
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def test_rejects_literal_private(self, url: str) -> None:
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with pytest.raises(UnsafeURLError):
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validate_outbound_url(url)
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class TestAsyncValidator:
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_async_rejects_loopback(self) -> None:
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with pytest.raises(UnsafeURLError):
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await avalidate_outbound_url("http://127.0.0.1/")
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_async_rejects_bad_scheme(self) -> None:
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with pytest.raises(UnsafeURLError):
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await avalidate_outbound_url("file:///etc/passwd")
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