10d30fc956
Comprehensive multi-area pass driven by a parallel 8-agent production
review. Frontend, backend, database, security, performance, operational,
plus a new self-monitoring feature.
## Critical fixes
- Planka webhook: reads bounded raw body (was NameError on every call)
- HA quiet hours: ha_state_changed/automation_triggered/service_called/
event_fired added to deferrable set (were silently dropped)
- DNS-rebinding SSRF: PinnedResolver wired into shared aiohttp session
- Telegram inbound webhook: secret now mandatory (401 without)
- Generic webhook: auth_mode="none" requires explicit
acknowledge_unauthenticated=true; per-IP rate limit 60/min
- svelte-check: 5 null-narrowing errors in EventDetailModal fixed
- Provider hardcoding: Immich-only block extracted to descriptor
featureDiscoveryHint
- command_sync: snapshot+expunge bot before exiting AsyncSession
## Bug fixes
- notifier asyncio.gather(return_exceptions=True) — one bad chat no longer
cancels peer sends
- NotificationDispatcher hoisted out of per-tracker loop
- Provider credential resolution unified across all 5 dispatch sites
- HA asyncio.shield now drains inner task on cancellation
- Provider construction switched from if/elif ladder to factory registry
- NUT first poll seeds silently (no spurious ups_on_battery)
- Quiet-hours gate: event-type-disabled now wins over deferral
- APScheduler drain job ID resolution upgraded to seconds
- HA on_status_change wired through to EventLog
- Webhook payload rollback failures now logged (not swallowed)
- Batched receivers/chats/bots in load_link_data (was per-target N+1)
- flag_modified on JSON column reassignments in deferred_dispatch
## Database
- UNIQUE indexes on service_provider.webhook_token,
telegram_bot.webhook_path_id, partial UNIQUE on telegram_bot.bot_id,
telegram_chat(bot_id, chat_id), notification_tracker_target unique link,
partial UNIQUE on bridge_self provider per user
- Composite ix_event_log_user_event_type_created index
- save_chat_from_webhook switched to ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE
- ondelete=CASCADE on user-id FKs (model annotation; app-side cascade
delete added for existing data)
- delete_notification_tracker converted from N+1 to bulk DELETE/UPDATE
- Module-level asyncio.Lock replaced with lazy _get_lock() pattern
- VACUUM INTO snapshot now PRAGMA integrity_check verified
## Performance
- Jinja2 template compilation LRU cached (lru_cache maxsize=512)
- Per-locale render cache in NotificationDispatcher (skips re-rendering
identical content for receivers sharing a locale)
- Tracker list cached per provider_id with 5s TTL + explicit invalidation
on tracker CRUD (relieves HA chat-bus rate query pressure)
- Nav-counts collapsed from 16 round-trips to single UNION ALL
- HA event_log: skip persisting empty assets_added/removed events
## Security hardening
- Mass-assignment guard on Action create/update; cron sub-minute reject
- Backup JSON depth/node-count cap (depth ≤ 10, nodes ≤ 100k)
- _sanitize_config extended to all JSON-typed fields on backup import
- Telegram _safe_get walks redirects manually with SSRF revalidation
- Bcrypt 72-byte password length cap with clear 422
- Webhook payload body redaction; sensitive substring set extended with
oauth/client_secret/webhook_secret/csrf in both header filter and
template extras filter
## Frontend
- 76 catch (err: any) sites converted to errMsg(err) helper
- globalProviderFilter: pure getter; reconciliation moved to one-time
$effect in +layout
- Provider-filter binding: removed paired $effects + _syncingFilter flag,
now one-way derived
- entity-cache: separate _refreshing flag for background re-fetches
- api.ts 401 handling: AuthRedirectError class + dedup _redirecting flag,
goto() instead of window.location.href
- a11y: aria-expanded on mobile More, role=switch + aria-checked on
Telegram bot toggles
## Tests & operations
- CI pytest gate added to .gitea/workflows/build.yml + release.yml
(wheel-built install to dodge editable-install slowness)
- /api/ready upgraded to deep healthcheck (db SELECT 1, scheduler.running,
HA supervisor presence) returning {ready, checks, errors, version}
- /api/metrics endpoint with prometheus_client (deferred_pending,
event_log_total, dispatch_duration, poll_failures, send_failures)
- New OPERATIONS.md covering deploy, healthchecks, metrics, backup/restore
procedures, log handling, common scenarios, upgrade flow
- New tests: test_bridge_self (11), test_gitea_parser (9),
test_planka_parser (6), test_immich_change_detector (6),
test_backup_roundtrip (1)
## New feature: bridge self-monitoring
- New bridge_self provider type — internal sink for bridge health events
- Three event types: bridge_self_poll_failures (consecutive tracker poll
failures), bridge_self_deferred_backlog (pending count crosses
threshold), bridge_self_target_failures (consecutive 5xx/network
failures per target)
- Per-user thresholds (defaults: 3 / 100 / 5) configurable via the
provider config form
- Auto-seeded on user create + /setup + boot backfill for existing users
- Anti-spam: counters reset after emission; backlog uses transition latch
- Self-loop guard: bridge_self failures don't count toward target-failure
thresholds (logged only) — wire to your own Telegram/Email/Matrix to
get notified when polls/dispatches/sends fail
- 6 default templates (3 events × 2 locales), tracking config columns
with backfill migration, frontend descriptor (excluded from "create
provider" wizard since auto-managed)
Operator-visible behavior changes (call out in release notes):
- NOTIFY_BRIDGE_TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET now REQUIRED for webhook mode
- Existing webhook providers with auth_mode="none" need explicit opt-in
- Generic webhook endpoint rate-limited 60/min per source IP
- HA disconnect/reconnect writes ha_status_* EventLog rows
- Every user gets a bridge_self provider — wire it to a target to
receive failure alerts
Pre-existing test failures (test_ssrf, test_release_provider) on
Python 3.13 are unrelated; CI runs on 3.12.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
263 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript
263 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* API client with JWT auth for the Notify Bridge backend.
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*/
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import { goto } from '$app/navigation';
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const API_BASE = '/api';
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/**
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* Thrown when the API client decides to redirect the user to /login (after a
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* terminal 401). Caller-side `try/catch` blocks can branch on
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* `instanceof AuthRedirectError` to skip showing an "Unauthorized" snackbar
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* — the redirect itself is the user-visible signal.
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*/
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export class AuthRedirectError extends Error {
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constructor() {
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super('Unauthorized — redirecting to login');
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this.name = 'AuthRedirectError';
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}
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}
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// Module-level dedupe — a burst of concurrent requests that all get 401 (e.g.
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// the dashboard's parallel cache loads) should only schedule a single
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// `goto('/login')` instead of stacking N navigations.
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let _redirecting = false;
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/** Centralised "send the user to /login" path used by both api() and fetchAuth(). */
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function redirectToLogin(): void {
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if (_redirecting) return;
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_redirecting = true;
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clearTokens();
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if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
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// SvelteKit's goto() with replaceState avoids leaving the failed page
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// in the back-stack (no "back-button to broken view" UX). We don't
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// reset `_redirecting` — the page about to unmount makes it moot.
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goto('/login', { replaceState: true });
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}
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}
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/** Normalize a caught error to a user-safe message. */
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export function errMsg(err: unknown, fallback = 'Unexpected error'): string {
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if (err instanceof Error && err.message) return err.message;
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if (typeof err === 'string' && err) return err;
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return fallback;
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}
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/** Structured 409 blocked-by payload attached to ApiError.blockedBy. */
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export interface BlockedByDetail {
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message: string;
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entity: string;
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blocked_by: string[];
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}
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export class ApiError extends Error {
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status: number;
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blockedBy?: BlockedByDetail;
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constructor(message: string, status: number, blockedBy?: BlockedByDetail) {
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super(message);
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this.name = 'ApiError';
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this.status = status;
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this.blockedBy = blockedBy;
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}
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}
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/** Parse a server-issued datetime string as UTC (appends Z if no timezone info present). */
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export function parseDate(dateStr: string): Date {
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if (!dateStr) return new Date(NaN);
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if (!/Z$|[+-]\d{2}:?\d{2}$/.test(dateStr)) return new Date(dateStr + 'Z');
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return new Date(dateStr);
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}
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/** If the thrown error was a structured 409 from delete_protection, return its payload. */
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export function getBlockedBy(err: unknown): BlockedByDetail | null {
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if (err instanceof ApiError && err.blockedBy) return err.blockedBy;
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return null;
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}
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function getToken(): string | null {
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if (typeof window === 'undefined') return null;
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return localStorage.getItem('access_token');
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}
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export function setTokens(access: string, refresh: string) {
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localStorage.setItem('access_token', access);
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localStorage.setItem('refresh_token', refresh);
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}
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export function clearTokens() {
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localStorage.removeItem('access_token');
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localStorage.removeItem('refresh_token');
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}
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export function isAuthenticated(): boolean {
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return !!getToken();
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}
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let refreshPromise: Promise<boolean> | null = null;
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async function refreshAccessToken(): Promise<boolean> {
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if (refreshPromise) return refreshPromise;
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refreshPromise = doRefreshAccessToken().finally(() => {
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refreshPromise = null;
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});
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return refreshPromise;
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}
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async function doRefreshAccessToken(): Promise<boolean> {
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if (typeof window === 'undefined') return false;
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const refreshToken = localStorage.getItem('refresh_token');
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if (!refreshToken) return false;
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try {
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const res = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/auth/refresh`, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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body: JSON.stringify({ refresh_token: refreshToken })
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});
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if (res.ok) {
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const data = await res.json();
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setTokens(data.access_token, data.refresh_token);
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return true;
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}
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} catch (e) {
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console.warn('Token refresh failed:', e);
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}
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return false;
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}
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const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
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// Longer cap for fetchAuth — it's used for multipart uploads (backup restore)
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// and binary downloads where a 30s limit can cut off a legit slow upload.
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const DEFAULT_FETCHAUTH_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
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export async function api<T = any>(
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path: string,
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options: RequestInit & { timeoutMs?: number } = {}
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): Promise<T> {
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const token = getToken();
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const headers: Record<string, string> = {
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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...(options.headers as Record<string, string>)
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};
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if (token) {
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headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${token}`;
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}
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const { timeoutMs, ...fetchOptions } = options;
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const controller = new AbortController();
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const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS);
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const signal = options.signal ?? controller.signal;
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try {
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let res = await fetch(`${API_BASE}${path}`, { ...fetchOptions, headers, signal });
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// Try token refresh on 401
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if (res.status === 401 && token) {
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const refreshed = await refreshAccessToken();
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if (refreshed) {
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headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${getToken()}`;
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res = await fetch(`${API_BASE}${path}`, { ...fetchOptions, headers, signal });
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}
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}
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if (res.status === 401 && token) {
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redirectToLogin();
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// Tagged so the caller's catch can distinguish "we already showed
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// the user a redirect" from a real authorization failure they
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// should snackbar.
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throw new AuthRedirectError();
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}
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if (res.status === 204) return undefined as T;
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if (!res.ok) {
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const err = await res.json().catch(() => ({ detail: res.statusText }));
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// Structured blocked-by detail (from delete_protection.raise_if_used)
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if (err && err.detail && typeof err.detail === 'object' && Array.isArray(err.detail.blocked_by)) {
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const bb: BlockedByDetail = {
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message: err.detail.message || `HTTP ${res.status}`,
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entity: err.detail.entity || '',
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blocked_by: err.detail.blocked_by,
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};
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throw new ApiError(bb.message, res.status, bb);
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}
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const msg = typeof err.detail === 'string' ? err.detail : (err.detail?.message || `HTTP ${res.status}`);
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throw new ApiError(msg, res.status);
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}
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return res.json();
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} finally {
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clearTimeout(timeout);
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}
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}
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/**
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* Auth-aware ``fetch`` wrapper for calls that can't go through ``api()`` —
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* typically multipart/form-data uploads or binary downloads where we need the
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* raw ``Response`` object rather than parsed JSON.
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*
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* - Injects the Bearer token automatically.
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* - Does NOT set ``Content-Type`` (the caller's body — e.g. ``FormData`` —
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* decides the encoding; browsers add the boundary).
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* - Attempts a one-shot token refresh on 401, matching ``api()``.
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* - Translates non-OK responses to ``ApiError`` so callers can use the same
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* ``getBlockedBy`` / ``err.message`` handling pattern.
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*/
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export async function fetchAuth(
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path: string,
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options: RequestInit & { timeoutMs?: number } = {},
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): Promise<Response> {
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const token = getToken();
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const headers: Record<string, string> = { ...(options.headers as Record<string, string>) };
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if (token) headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${token}`;
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const url = path.startsWith('http') ? path : `${API_BASE}${path}`;
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// Abort after timeout so uploads/downloads don't hang indefinitely if
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// the backend stops responding. Callers can override per-request via
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// options.timeoutMs or pass their own signal to opt out.
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const { timeoutMs, ...fetchOptions } = options;
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const controller = new AbortController();
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const timeout = setTimeout(
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() => controller.abort(),
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timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_FETCHAUTH_TIMEOUT_MS,
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);
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const signal = options.signal ?? controller.signal;
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try {
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let res = await fetch(url, { ...fetchOptions, headers, signal });
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if (res.status === 401 && token) {
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const refreshed = await refreshAccessToken();
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if (refreshed) {
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headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${getToken()}`;
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res = await fetch(url, { ...fetchOptions, headers, signal });
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}
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}
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if (res.status === 401) {
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redirectToLogin();
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throw new AuthRedirectError();
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}
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if (!res.ok) {
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const err = await res.clone().json().catch(() => ({ detail: res.statusText }));
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if (err && err.detail && typeof err.detail === 'object' && Array.isArray(err.detail.blocked_by)) {
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const bb: BlockedByDetail = {
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message: err.detail.message || `HTTP ${res.status}`,
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entity: err.detail.entity || '',
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blocked_by: err.detail.blocked_by,
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};
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throw new ApiError(bb.message, res.status, bb);
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}
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const msg = typeof err.detail === 'string' ? err.detail : (err.detail?.message || `HTTP ${res.status}`);
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throw new ApiError(msg, res.status);
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}
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return res;
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} finally {
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clearTimeout(timeout);
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}
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}
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