feat(webhook): HMAC-SHA256 signature verification on inbound webhooks

Adds an opt-in inbound HMAC scheme so a leaked URL alone is not enough
to forge deploy/sync requests — the caller must also know a separate
signing secret. Header format is X-Hub-Signature-256, matching the
Gitea/GitHub/GitLab convention so existing CI integrations work without
custom code.

Behaviour:
- per-project / per-site signing_secret is independent of the URL secret
- require_signature flag does a hard 401 on missing/invalid signatures
- even when require_signature is off, an *invalid* submitted signature
  returns 401 — surfaces CI misconfiguration instead of silently passing
- comparison uses subtle/hmac.Equal (constant time)

Backend:
- store: webhook_signing_secret + webhook_require_signature columns on
  projects + static_sites; scanProject helper, scan helpers updated; new
  Set* helpers for both fields
- webhook/handler: verifyHMAC helper, body read once, integrated into
  both project and site handlers
- api: per-entity signing-secret rotate / disable / require-toggle
  endpoints under /api/{projects,sites}/{id}/webhook/...

Frontend:
- WebhookPanel gains optional signing handlers (no breaking change for
  existing callers; signing UI hides when handlers aren't wired)
- one-shot reveal of the issued secret with copy + dismiss
- ToggleSwitch for require-signature, disabled until a secret is issued
- en/ru i18n strings

Tests:
- HMACRequiredAndValid (200 + deploy fires)
- HMACRequiredButMissing (401, no deploy)
- HMACPresentButWrong (401 even when require_signature=false)
- HMACOptionalUnsignedAccepted (200 when neither configured)
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-07 02:34:40 +03:00
parent 793570f4a1
commit 831b5c1a43
14 changed files with 827 additions and 40 deletions
+8
View File
@@ -151,6 +151,14 @@ func (s *Store) runMigrations() error {
// triggers a "pre-deploy" Tinyforge DB backup before any project deploy
// so a corrupted deploy is recoverable without data loss.
`ALTER TABLE settings ADD COLUMN auto_backup_before_deploy INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`,
// Per-entity inbound HMAC signing (2026-05-07). webhook_signing_secret
// is the HMAC-SHA256 key separate from the URL secret so a leaked URL
// alone is not sufficient to forge a valid request. require_signature
// rejects unsigned requests when set (defense-in-depth opt-in).
`ALTER TABLE projects ADD COLUMN webhook_signing_secret TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''`,
`ALTER TABLE projects ADD COLUMN webhook_require_signature INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`,
`ALTER TABLE static_sites ADD COLUMN webhook_signing_secret TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''`,
`ALTER TABLE static_sites ADD COLUMN webhook_require_signature INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`,
}
// Additive stack tables (2026-04-16). Created here rather than in the