feat(webhook): HMAC-SHA256 signature verification on inbound webhooks
Adds an opt-in inbound HMAC scheme so a leaked URL alone is not enough
to forge deploy/sync requests — the caller must also know a separate
signing secret. Header format is X-Hub-Signature-256, matching the
Gitea/GitHub/GitLab convention so existing CI integrations work without
custom code.
Behaviour:
- per-project / per-site signing_secret is independent of the URL secret
- require_signature flag does a hard 401 on missing/invalid signatures
- even when require_signature is off, an *invalid* submitted signature
returns 401 — surfaces CI misconfiguration instead of silently passing
- comparison uses subtle/hmac.Equal (constant time)
Backend:
- store: webhook_signing_secret + webhook_require_signature columns on
projects + static_sites; scanProject helper, scan helpers updated; new
Set* helpers for both fields
- webhook/handler: verifyHMAC helper, body read once, integrated into
both project and site handlers
- api: per-entity signing-secret rotate / disable / require-toggle
endpoints under /api/{projects,sites}/{id}/webhook/...
Frontend:
- WebhookPanel gains optional signing handlers (no breaking change for
existing callers; signing UI hides when handlers aren't wired)
- one-shot reveal of the issued secret with copy + dismiss
- ToggleSwitch for require-signature, disabled until a secret is issued
- en/ru i18n strings
Tests:
- HMACRequiredAndValid (200 + deploy fires)
- HMACRequiredButMissing (401, no deploy)
- HMACPresentButWrong (401 even when require_signature=false)
- HMACOptionalUnsignedAccepted (200 when neither configured)
This commit is contained in:
@@ -151,6 +151,14 @@ func (s *Store) runMigrations() error {
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// triggers a "pre-deploy" Tinyforge DB backup before any project deploy
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// so a corrupted deploy is recoverable without data loss.
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`ALTER TABLE settings ADD COLUMN auto_backup_before_deploy INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`,
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// Per-entity inbound HMAC signing (2026-05-07). webhook_signing_secret
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// is the HMAC-SHA256 key separate from the URL secret so a leaked URL
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// alone is not sufficient to forge a valid request. require_signature
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// rejects unsigned requests when set (defense-in-depth opt-in).
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`ALTER TABLE projects ADD COLUMN webhook_signing_secret TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''`,
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`ALTER TABLE projects ADD COLUMN webhook_require_signature INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`,
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`ALTER TABLE static_sites ADD COLUMN webhook_signing_secret TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''`,
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`ALTER TABLE static_sites ADD COLUMN webhook_require_signature INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`,
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}
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// Additive stack tables (2026-04-16). Created here rather than in the
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