Add a deploy_strategy field to each source's config blob — "" (default),
"recreate", or "blue-green" — validated in each source's Validate and read on
the deploy path. No new DB column, no migration: the field rides inside the
existing SourceConfig JSON and every existing workload decodes "" to its
historical behavior (image -> blue-green, others -> recreate).
The real gap this closes: dockerfile and static stopped the old container
before creating the new one on every redeploy — a downtime window image never
had. Their blue-green branch now:
- names the new "green" container with a unique suffix so it coexists with the
still-serving blue (plumbed into both the container name AND the proxy
forwardHost);
- skips the collision teardown that destroyed blue early;
- gates green — an HTTP readiness probe (deps.Health.Check) when a healthcheck
is configured, else the existing liveness window;
- swaps the route via a pure upsert (no pre-DeleteRoute) so NPM repoints in
place with no gap;
- persists green into the single runtime-state row BEFORE reaping blue, so a
crash mid-swap can never orphan green or leave the row pointing at a removed
container (state.go/teardown.go/reconcile.go stay untouched).
image honors explicit "recreate" (reap existing containers after pull, before
cutover); its default blue-green path is unchanged. compose stays
stack-managed and rejects "blue-green" at Validate so the contract is honest.
static forces recreate for storage-backed deno sites — blue-green would mount
the same RW volume into both containers at once.
Shared helper internal/workload/plugin/strategy.go (ValidateStrategy +
BuildGreenName). Backend-only (phase 1); the field is usable today via the
app's advanced-JSON editor — a friendly toggle + i18n follow in phase 2.
Tests: ValidateStrategy matrix, per-source Validate (incl. the empty-key
backward-compat lock), and effectiveStrategy defaults + the deno gate. Design
+ adversarial review: docs/plans/DEPLOY_STRATEGY_PLAN.md.
Secrets defined once and applied to many workloads by scope (global or
per-app), encrypted at rest and resolved into container env as a
low-precedence default layer: global-shared < app-shared < image cfg.Env
< workload_env. A workload with no applicable shared secrets is
byte-identical to the prior workload_env-only behavior.
- store: shared_secrets table + CRUD + ListApplicableSharedSecrets
(enabled global + app, global-first), UNIQUE(scope,app_id,name).
- plugin.ResolveSharedSecrets + integration into BuildWorkloadEnv
(static/dockerfile) and image buildEnv; best-effort — a shared-secret
store/decrypt error never fails a deploy, and values are never logged.
- REST CRUD at /api/shared-secrets (reads authed, mutations AdminOnly);
values encrypted at the boundary via crypto.Encrypt and never returned
(only a has_value flag), mirroring workload_env. UNIQUE collisions 409.
Compose is out of scope (YAML-defined env). Frontend rule UI is Phase 2.
Reviewed: go + security APPROVE (0 CRITICAL/HIGH); two MEDIUMs fixed
(translateSQLError -> 409, no driver-message leak). Deferred defense-in-
depth: json:"-" on the model value + a description length cap.
Every deploy across all four source kinds now writes a workload-scoped
event via a shared plugin.EmitDeployEvent helper (replacing the inline
emit duplicated in static/dockerfile, standardizing static's metadata
key site_id->workload_id, and adding emission to image+compose which
were silent). New indexed event_log.workload_id column, EventLogFilter
.WorkloadID, and GET /api/workloads/{id}/events (id pinned from path).
Frontend: a forge "Activity" panel on /apps/[id] reusing EventLogEntry,
live SSE prepend filtered by workload_id, load-more pagination, an
All/Errors severity filter, and a shared toEventLogEntry mapper. en/ru
i18n parity.
Security: compose's failure status emits a generic reason instead of raw
`docker compose up` output, which can echo app secrets and egresses to
operator webhooks (NotificationURL + event-trigger actions); full detail
stays only in the returned error. Rune-safe 256-rune status cap.
Reviewed: go + typescript APPROVE; security HIGH fixed.
alexei.dolgolyov