Files
alexei.dolgolyov 410a131cec feat(apps): stepped creation wizard, branch previews, and app-creation fixes
This session (frontend focus):
- Rebuild /apps/new as a 4-step wizard (Basics → Configure → Trigger → Review):
  WizardRail, SourceKindPicker card grid, AppManifest review, per-step validation,
  ConfirmDialog-based unsaved-changes guard.
- Extract lib/workload/sourceForms.ts (single source of truth for source_config)
  + {Image,Compose,Static,Dockerfile}SourceForm + StaticDiscoveryWizard; fold the
  /apps/[id] edit form onto the same components (removes the duplication). Add
  vitest + sourceForms unit tests.
- Branch preview environments UI: /chain is_preview/preview_branch + a Preview
  environments panel on /apps/[id] (per-branch URLs, ConfirmDialog teardown, armed
  state); RegistryImagePicker on the registry trigger and the image source.
- Fixes: image-inspect 404 -> admin-gated POST /api/discovery/image/inspect;
  conflict-panel blur flicker; friendly localized discovery errors; CPU/Memory
  label hints; dashboard + /apps "Total workloads" count only source_kind workloads
  (drop stale trigger_kind gate); NPM cert/access-list name cache; EntityPicker
  empty-list guard.
- Update CLAUDE.md frontend conventions + add a Build & Test section.

Also captures pre-existing in-progress platform work (not from this session):
workload notifications, Prometheus metrics export, store lockfile, health probes,
backup hardening, and related store/webhook/scheduler changes.
2026-05-29 02:09:54 +03:00

136 lines
4.3 KiB
Go

package crypto
import (
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"strings"
)
// ErrNoKey is returned when ENCRYPTION_KEY is not set.
var ErrNoKey = errors.New("ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable is not set")
// ErrDecryptFailed wraps any cipher.Open / decoder failure. Callers
// upgrading from the silent-fallback pattern (treat-as-plaintext when
// decrypt errored) MUST instead surface this — a rotated key would
// otherwise silently leak ciphertext to upstream services as if it
// were plaintext.
var ErrDecryptFailed = errors.New("crypto: decrypt failed (wrong key, corrupted ciphertext, or unversioned legacy value)")
// envelopeV1Prefix tags ciphertext produced by Encrypt going forward.
// Older databases may carry unprefixed hex blobs from the v0 era; those
// are still readable via Decrypt for backward compatibility, but every
// new write goes through EncryptV1 and emits the prefix so a future key
// rotation has a clean fail-loud signal.
const envelopeV1Prefix = "tf1:"
// DeriveKey computes a 32-byte AES-256 key from the given passphrase using SHA-256.
// This is acceptable when ENCRYPTION_KEY is a high-entropy random string (e.g., 32+ hex chars).
// For human-chosen passphrases, consider Argon2id or PBKDF2 with a salt instead.
func DeriveKey(passphrase string) [32]byte {
return sha256.Sum256([]byte(passphrase))
}
// KeyFromEnv reads ENCRYPTION_KEY from the environment and derives a 32-byte key.
func KeyFromEnv() ([32]byte, error) {
raw := os.Getenv("ENCRYPTION_KEY")
if raw == "" {
return [32]byte{}, ErrNoKey
}
if len(raw) < 32 {
return [32]byte{}, fmt.Errorf("ENCRYPTION_KEY must be at least 32 characters long (got %d)", len(raw))
}
return DeriveKey(raw), nil
}
// Encrypt encrypts plaintext using AES-256-GCM with a random nonce.
// Returns a versioned envelope (tf1:<hex>) so downstream readers can
// distinguish ciphertext from accidentally-stored plaintext.
func Encrypt(key [32]byte, plaintext string) (string, error) {
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key[:])
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create cipher: %w", err)
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create gcm: %w", err)
}
nonce := make([]byte, gcm.NonceSize())
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, nonce); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("generate nonce: %w", err)
}
sealed := gcm.Seal(nonce, nonce, []byte(plaintext), nil)
return envelopeV1Prefix + hex.EncodeToString(sealed), nil
}
// HasEnvelope reports whether the value is a v1-prefixed ciphertext.
// Useful for router-level "decrypt only if encrypted" decision points
// that previously relied on `err == nil` from a try-decrypt — that
// pattern silently masked rotated-key failures.
func HasEnvelope(value string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(value, envelopeV1Prefix)
}
// Decrypt decrypts an envelope (tf1:<hex>). For backward compatibility
// it also accepts unprefixed hex from the v0 era — but only when the
// resulting plaintext is valid; a wrong key for legacy data now returns
// ErrDecryptFailed instead of silently treating ciphertext as
// plaintext.
//
// Callers MUST NOT swallow the error and fall back to "use as-is".
// That pattern is the exact footgun the envelope versioning removes.
func Decrypt(key [32]byte, ciphertext string) (string, error) {
hexBlob := ciphertext
if strings.HasPrefix(hexBlob, envelopeV1Prefix) {
hexBlob = hexBlob[len(envelopeV1Prefix):]
}
data, err := hex.DecodeString(hexBlob)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: decode hex: %v", ErrDecryptFailed, err)
}
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key[:])
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create cipher: %w", err)
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create gcm: %w", err)
}
nonceSize := gcm.NonceSize()
if len(data) < nonceSize {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: ciphertext too short", ErrDecryptFailed)
}
nonce := data[:nonceSize]
body := data[nonceSize:]
plaintext, err := gcm.Open(nil, nonce, body, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrDecryptFailed, err)
}
return string(plaintext), nil
}
// EncryptIfNotEmpty encrypts the value only if it is non-empty.
// Returns empty string for empty input.
func EncryptIfNotEmpty(key [32]byte, value string) (string, error) {
if value == "" {
return "", nil
}
return Encrypt(key, value)
}