ea55d31177
Build / build (push) Successful in 10m43s
Two-stage feature arc closing the gaps left by the hard legacy cutover.
The static-site creation wizard regains its auto-discovery + connection-test
flow; /apps/[id] grows the runtime/storage/lifecycle surface the legacy
/sites/[id] page used to expose.
Backend (Go)
- internal/api/discovery.go: six admin-gated endpoints wrapping
staticsite.GitProvider — POST /api/discovery/git/{detect-provider,
test-connection,repos,branches,tree} + GET /api/discovery/image/conflicts.
Identifier validation (validateGitIdent / validateGitBranch) at the
boundary so provider URL interpolation cannot be hijacked via `..`.
Upstream errors scrubbed: detailed slog on the server, generic 502 to
the client (mitigates token-reflection-in-error-page).
- internal/api/workload_runtime.go: four endpoints —
GET /api/workloads/{id}/runtime-state decodes containers.extra_json for
static workloads; GET /api/workloads/{id}/storage execs `du -sb /app/data`
with a 30s in-process cache (storageProbeCache) so polling can't turn
into per-request execs; POST /api/workloads/{id}/{stop,start} iterate
ListContainersByWorkload and call docker.StopContainer / StartContainer,
returning 200 / 409 (nothing to act on) / 502 (all failed).
- internal/staticsite/safehttp.go: NewSafeHTTPClient + ValidateBaseURL +
blockReason. DialContext re-resolves hostnames and refuses loopback /
link-local / multicast / unspecified addresses. RFC1918 + ULA explicitly
allowed (self-hosted Gitea on LAN is the dominant deployment).
Replaced four raw &http.Client{} constructions in the provider files.
- internal/staticsite/gitlab_provider.go: url.PathEscape each segment in
the raw-file URL builder for parity with projectPath().
- Test coverage: 26 cases in discovery_test.go (image-tag stripping,
source-config decoding, conflict scenarios, validator boundaries,
scheme rejection), 14 in workload_runtime_test.go (404 / 409 / nil-docker
/ probe-cache), 16 in safehttp_test.go (URL validation + block-reason
policy matrix + live dial against loopback + AWS metadata literals).
Frontend (Svelte 5 + runes)
- web/src/lib/api.ts: typed wrappers for every endpoint, AbortSignal
threaded through post(); ApiError exported so callers can narrow on
e.status; new DetectedGitProvider narrow union.
- web/src/routes/apps/new/+page.svelte: static-form discovery controls
(auto-detect provider, test connection, repo / branch / folder
EntityPickers, Deno auto-detect); image-form conflict panel with
debounced lookup + double-click submit guard ("Forge anyway") + Inspect
button that pre-fills port/healthcheck; English error fallbacks routed
through apps.new.errors.* (en + ru).
- web/src/routes/apps/[id]/+page.svelte: runtime-state panel + storage
panel + Stop / Start / Open-site toolbar; universal live-state badge
in the hero lede for image/compose/static (RUNNING / TRANSITIONING /
STOPPED / NOT DEPLOYED / MIXED · n/m RUNNING); ContainerStats panel
per row (auto-collapsing native <details> when N > 2); read-only
webhook bindings summary card; responsive toolbar overflow with native
<details> at <640px (z-index 100 above sticky nav).
- web/src/app.css: project-wide .forge-btn-ghost:focus-visible outline.
Hardening from go-reviewer + security-reviewer + typescript-reviewer +
frontend-design UI/UX subagents (0 CRITICAL, all HIGH/BLOCKER addressed
inline, IMPORTANT applied before commit):
- AbortController + per-call sequence tokens on every long-running
fetch (loadRuntimeState / loadStorage / loadTriggerMeta / inspectImage /
listImageConflicts) plus onDestroy cleanup so late resolves cannot
mutate dead component state.
- doStop / doStart snapshot and restore `error` across the finally-block
reload so a load()-cleared message doesn't hide a real failure.
- triggersById refreshed after inline trigger creation so the webhook
card doesn't silently exclude the just-created trigger.
- Live-state badge wraps in role=status / aria-live=polite (no redundant
aria-label).
- Webhook row has a single click target (was two pointing at the same URL).
- Empty webhook section hides entirely.
- Dropped role=menu / role=menuitem from the overflow menu (they would
promise arrow-key nav we don't wire; native Tab + ESC carry it).
Doc
- docs/CODEMAPS/INDEX.md + new docs/CODEMAPS/discovery-and-runtime.md
map the endpoint surface, security posture, frontend integration
patterns, and an "add a new probe" recipe.
Verification
- svelte-check: 0 errors, 3 pre-existing a11y warnings.
- go build + go vet + go test ./...: all green.
- i18n parity: en + ru at 1413 keys each.
- Live smoke against :8090: 404 / 409 / 502 envelopes correct, discovery
sanity passes, ProbeError surfaces on no-container path.
440 lines
16 KiB
Go
440 lines
16 KiB
Go
package api
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"log/slog"
|
|
"sync"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/auth"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/backup"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/crypto"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/dns"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/docker"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/events"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/notify"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/npm"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/proxy"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/stale"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/store"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/webhook"
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/workload/plugin"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// DNSProviderChangedFunc is called when DNS settings change so the caller can
|
|
// update the provider on the deployer.
|
|
type DNSProviderChangedFunc func(provider dns.Provider)
|
|
|
|
// PluginDispatcher is the subset of the deployer the API layer uses for the
|
|
// plugin-native dispatch surface (generic-hooks endpoint + workload teardown
|
|
// + future surfaces). Defined here so the API does not import the deployer
|
|
// package directly.
|
|
type PluginDispatcher interface {
|
|
webhook.PluginDispatcher
|
|
DispatchTeardown(ctx context.Context, w plugin.Workload) error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Server holds all dependencies for the API layer.
|
|
type Server struct {
|
|
store *store.Store
|
|
docker *docker.Client
|
|
npm *npm.Client // optional: only for NPM-specific endpoints (certificates)
|
|
proxyProvider proxy.Provider
|
|
deployer PluginDispatcher
|
|
notifier *notify.Notifier
|
|
webhook *webhook.Handler
|
|
eventBus *events.Bus
|
|
encKey [32]byte
|
|
localAuth *auth.LocalAuth
|
|
oidcProvider *auth.OIDCProvider
|
|
staleScanner *stale.Scanner
|
|
|
|
dnsProviderMu sync.RWMutex
|
|
dnsProvider dns.Provider
|
|
onDNSProviderChanged DNSProviderChangedFunc
|
|
|
|
backupEngine *backup.Engine
|
|
sseGate *sseGate
|
|
logScanReloader LogScanReloader
|
|
dbPath string
|
|
shutdownFunc func() // called after restore to trigger graceful shutdown
|
|
onBackupSettingsChanged func(enabled bool, intervalHours int) // called when backup settings change
|
|
onProxyProviderChanged func(provider proxy.Provider) // called when proxy provider changes
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewServer creates a new API Server with all required dependencies.
|
|
func NewServer(
|
|
st *store.Store,
|
|
dockerClient *docker.Client,
|
|
npmClient *npm.Client,
|
|
proxyProvider proxy.Provider,
|
|
deployer PluginDispatcher,
|
|
notifier *notify.Notifier,
|
|
webhookHandler *webhook.Handler,
|
|
eventBus *events.Bus,
|
|
encKey [32]byte,
|
|
) *Server {
|
|
localAuth := auth.NewLocalAuth(encKey)
|
|
|
|
s := &Server{
|
|
store: st,
|
|
docker: dockerClient,
|
|
npm: npmClient,
|
|
proxyProvider: proxyProvider,
|
|
deployer: deployer,
|
|
notifier: notifier,
|
|
webhook: webhookHandler,
|
|
eventBus: eventBus,
|
|
encKey: encKey,
|
|
localAuth: localAuth,
|
|
sseGate: newSSEGate(maxConcurrentSSEStreams),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Try to initialize OIDC provider from stored settings.
|
|
authSettings, err := st.GetAuthSettings()
|
|
if err == nil && authSettings.AuthMode == "oidc" && authSettings.OIDCIssuerURL != "" {
|
|
s.initOIDCProvider(context.Background(), authSettings)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return s
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetStaleScanner sets the stale scanner on the server.
|
|
// Called after both the API server and scanner are initialized.
|
|
func (s *Server) SetStaleScanner(scanner *stale.Scanner) {
|
|
s.staleScanner = scanner
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetBackupEngine sets the backup engine on the server.
|
|
func (s *Server) SetBackupEngine(engine *backup.Engine) {
|
|
s.backupEngine = engine
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetDBPath sets the database file path (needed for restore).
|
|
func (s *Server) SetDBPath(path string) {
|
|
s.dbPath = path
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetShutdownFunc sets the function called after a restore to trigger graceful shutdown.
|
|
func (s *Server) SetShutdownFunc(fn func()) {
|
|
s.shutdownFunc = fn
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetBackupSettingsChangedCallback sets the callback for when backup settings change.
|
|
func (s *Server) SetBackupSettingsChangedCallback(fn func(enabled bool, intervalHours int)) {
|
|
s.onBackupSettingsChanged = fn
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetProxyProviderChangedCallback sets the callback for when the proxy provider changes.
|
|
func (s *Server) SetProxyProviderChangedCallback(fn func(provider proxy.Provider)) {
|
|
s.onProxyProviderChanged = fn
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetProxyProvider updates the proxy provider at runtime.
|
|
func (s *Server) SetProxyProvider(provider proxy.Provider) {
|
|
s.proxyProvider = provider
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetDNSProvider sets the current DNS provider on the server.
|
|
func (s *Server) SetDNSProvider(provider dns.Provider) {
|
|
s.dnsProviderMu.Lock()
|
|
defer s.dnsProviderMu.Unlock()
|
|
s.dnsProvider = provider
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getDNSProviderLocked returns the current DNS provider under read lock.
|
|
func (s *Server) getDNSProviderLocked() dns.Provider {
|
|
s.dnsProviderMu.RLock()
|
|
defer s.dnsProviderMu.RUnlock()
|
|
return s.dnsProvider
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetDNSProviderChangedCallback sets the callback for when DNS settings change.
|
|
func (s *Server) SetDNSProviderChangedCallback(fn DNSProviderChangedFunc) {
|
|
s.onDNSProviderChanged = fn
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// initOIDCProvider creates an OIDC provider from settings. Errors are logged, not fatal.
|
|
func (s *Server) initOIDCProvider(ctx context.Context, as store.AuthSettings) {
|
|
// Decrypt the OIDC client secret if it's encrypted.
|
|
clientSecret := as.OIDCClientSecret
|
|
if clientSecret != "" {
|
|
if decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(s.encKey, clientSecret); err == nil {
|
|
clientSecret = decrypted
|
|
}
|
|
// If decrypt fails, assume it's already plaintext (migration scenario).
|
|
}
|
|
provider, err := auth.NewOIDCProvider(ctx, auth.OIDCConfig{
|
|
IssuerURL: as.OIDCIssuerURL,
|
|
ClientID: as.OIDCClientID,
|
|
ClientSecret: clientSecret,
|
|
RedirectURL: as.OIDCRedirectURL,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("failed to initialize OIDC provider", "error", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
s.oidcProvider = provider
|
|
slog.Info("OIDC provider initialized", "issuer", as.OIDCIssuerURL)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Router returns a chi router with all API routes mounted.
|
|
func (s *Server) Router() chi.Router {
|
|
r := chi.NewRouter()
|
|
|
|
// Global middleware.
|
|
r.Use(recovery)
|
|
r.Use(securityHeaders)
|
|
r.Use(logging)
|
|
r.Use(cors)
|
|
|
|
loginLimiter := newRateLimiter()
|
|
webhookLimiter := newRateLimiter()
|
|
|
|
r.Route("/api", func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
// JSON content type and body size limit for API routes.
|
|
r.Use(jsonContentType)
|
|
r.Use(limitBody)
|
|
|
|
// Public auth endpoints (no auth required).
|
|
r.Get("/auth/mode", s.authMode)
|
|
r.Post("/auth/login", s.rateLimitedLogin(loginLimiter))
|
|
r.Get("/auth/oidc/login", s.oidcLogin)
|
|
r.Get("/auth/oidc/callback", s.oidcCallback)
|
|
r.Post("/auth/oidc/token", s.oidcExchangeToken)
|
|
|
|
// Webhook handler (uses its own secret-based auth).
|
|
// Per-IP rate limit prevents an attacker who has guessed (or leaked)
|
|
// a secret from triggering a deploy storm, and rejects unauthenticated
|
|
// brute-force probes over the secret URL space.
|
|
r.With(rateLimitMiddleware(webhookLimiter)).Mount("/webhook", s.webhook.Route())
|
|
|
|
// Protected routes: require valid JWT.
|
|
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
r.Use(auth.Middleware(s.localAuth))
|
|
|
|
// Plugin registry inspection + unified ingress.
|
|
r.Get("/hooks/kinds", s.listHookKinds)
|
|
r.Get("/hooks/kinds/{kind}/schema", s.getHookKindSchema)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Post("/hooks/generic", s.dispatchGeneric)
|
|
|
|
// Workload-creation discovery helpers: provider probe,
|
|
// connection test, repo / branch / tree browsers, and
|
|
// image-source conflict detection. Admin-gated because
|
|
// they accept an access token + can enumerate other
|
|
// workloads' images.
|
|
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
r.Use(auth.AdminOnly)
|
|
r.Post("/discovery/git/detect-provider", s.detectGitProvider)
|
|
r.Post("/discovery/git/test-connection", s.testGitConnection)
|
|
r.Post("/discovery/git/repos", s.listGitRepos)
|
|
r.Post("/discovery/git/branches", s.listGitBranches)
|
|
r.Post("/discovery/git/tree", s.listGitTree)
|
|
r.Get("/discovery/image/conflicts", s.listImageConflicts)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Read-only endpoints (any authenticated user).
|
|
r.Get("/health", s.getHealth)
|
|
r.Get("/auth/me", s.currentUser)
|
|
r.Post("/auth/logout", s.logout)
|
|
r.Get("/proxies", s.listProxyRoutes)
|
|
r.Get("/docker/unused-images", s.unusedImageStats)
|
|
r.Get("/events", s.streamEvents)
|
|
r.Get("/events/log", s.listEventLog)
|
|
r.Get("/events/log/stats", s.getEventLogStats)
|
|
r.Get("/registries", s.listRegistries)
|
|
r.Route("/registries/{id}", func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
r.Get("/tags/*", s.listRegistryTags)
|
|
r.Get("/images", s.listRegistryImages)
|
|
|
|
// Admin-only registry mutations.
|
|
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
r.Use(auth.AdminOnly)
|
|
r.Put("/", s.updateRegistry)
|
|
r.Delete("/", s.deleteRegistry)
|
|
r.Post("/test", s.testRegistry)
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
r.Get("/settings", s.getSettings)
|
|
r.Get("/settings/npm-certificates", s.listNpmCertificates)
|
|
r.Get("/settings/npm-access-lists", s.listNpmAccessLists)
|
|
|
|
// Volume scope metadata (read-only).
|
|
r.Get("/volumes/scopes", s.listVolumeScopes)
|
|
|
|
// Stale container endpoints (read).
|
|
r.Get("/containers/stale", s.listStaleContainers)
|
|
|
|
// Workload-shaped endpoints — the canonical surface after the
|
|
// hard cutover. Reads open to any authenticated user; mutations
|
|
// admin-gated.
|
|
r.Get("/workloads", s.listWorkloads)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Post("/workloads", s.createPluginWorkload)
|
|
r.Route("/workloads/{id}", func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
r.Get("/", s.getWorkload)
|
|
r.Get("/containers", s.listWorkloadContainers)
|
|
r.Get("/containers/{cid}/logs", s.streamWorkloadContainerLogs)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Patch("/app", s.updateWorkloadAppID)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Put("/plugin", s.updatePluginWorkload)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Post("/deploy", s.deployPluginWorkload)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Post("/stop", s.stopPluginWorkload)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Post("/start", s.startPluginWorkload)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Delete("/", s.deletePluginWorkload)
|
|
|
|
// Runtime view: per-source persisted state + storage usage.
|
|
// Read-only; safe for any authenticated user.
|
|
r.Get("/runtime-state", s.getWorkloadRuntimeState)
|
|
r.Get("/storage", s.getWorkloadStorage)
|
|
|
|
// Per-workload env vars. Listing open to authenticated readers;
|
|
// mutations admin-gated. Encrypted values are write-only after store.
|
|
r.Get("/env", s.listWorkloadEnv)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Put("/env", s.setWorkloadEnv)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Delete("/env/{envID}", s.deleteWorkloadEnv)
|
|
|
|
// Per-workload inbound webhook URL handlers were dropped in
|
|
// the hard legacy cutover; inbound webhooks are now first-
|
|
// class Triggers reachable via /api/triggers/{id}/webhook.
|
|
|
|
// Per-workload volume mounts.
|
|
r.Get("/volumes", s.listWorkloadVolumes)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Put("/volumes", s.setWorkloadVolume)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Delete("/volumes/{volID}", s.deleteWorkloadVolume)
|
|
|
|
// Stages chain: parent + self + direct children, plus a
|
|
// promote-from action that copies the source workload's
|
|
// running image tag onto this workload's default_tag.
|
|
r.Get("/chain", s.getWorkloadChain)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Post("/promote-from/{sourceID}", s.promoteFromWorkload)
|
|
|
|
// Trigger bindings on this workload — the symmetric view
|
|
// of /triggers/{id}/bindings keyed on the workload side.
|
|
r.Get("/triggers", s.listBindingsForWorkload)
|
|
r.With(auth.AdminOnly).Post("/triggers", s.bindTriggerToWorkload)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Global container index, joined to workload + app names.
|
|
r.Get("/containers", s.listAllContainers)
|
|
r.Get("/containers/{id}", s.getContainer)
|
|
|
|
// App grouping (optional UI; admin-gated mutations).
|
|
r.Get("/apps", s.listApps)
|
|
r.Get("/apps/{id}", s.getApp)
|
|
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
r.Use(auth.AdminOnly)
|
|
r.Post("/apps", s.createApp)
|
|
r.Put("/apps/{id}", s.updateApp)
|
|
r.Delete("/apps/{id}", s.deleteApp)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// First-class Triggers (redeploy signal sources). One trigger
|
|
// fans out to many workloads via workload_trigger_bindings.
|
|
r.Get("/triggers", s.listTriggers)
|
|
r.Get("/triggers/{id}", s.getTrigger)
|
|
r.Get("/triggers/{id}/bindings", s.listBindingsForTrigger)
|
|
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
r.Use(auth.AdminOnly)
|
|
r.Post("/triggers", s.createTrigger)
|
|
r.Put("/triggers/{id}", s.updateTrigger)
|
|
r.Delete("/triggers/{id}", s.deleteTrigger)
|
|
r.Get("/triggers/{id}/webhook", s.getTriggerWebhook)
|
|
r.Post("/triggers/{id}/webhook/regenerate", s.regenerateTriggerWebhook)
|
|
r.Post("/triggers/{id}/fire", s.fireTriggerNow)
|
|
r.Post("/triggers/{id}/bindings", s.bindWorkloadToTrigger)
|
|
r.Put("/bindings/{bid}", s.updateBinding)
|
|
r.Delete("/bindings/{bid}", s.deleteBinding)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Event triggers: filter+action rules over the event_log stream.
|
|
r.Get("/event-triggers", s.listEventTriggers)
|
|
r.Get("/event-triggers/{id}", s.getEventTrigger)
|
|
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
r.Use(auth.AdminOnly)
|
|
r.Post("/event-triggers", s.createEventTrigger)
|
|
r.Patch("/event-triggers/{id}", s.updateEventTrigger)
|
|
r.Delete("/event-triggers/{id}", s.deleteEventTrigger)
|
|
r.Post("/event-triggers/{id}/test", s.testEventTrigger)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Log-scan rules.
|
|
r.Get("/log-scan-rules", s.listLogScanRules)
|
|
r.Get("/log-scan-rules/stats", s.getLogScanStats)
|
|
r.Get("/log-scan-rules/{id}", s.getLogScanRule)
|
|
r.Get("/workloads/{id}/effective-rules", s.getEffectiveLogScanRules)
|
|
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
r.Use(auth.AdminOnly)
|
|
r.Post("/log-scan-rules", s.createLogScanRule)
|
|
r.Patch("/log-scan-rules/{id}", s.updateLogScanRule)
|
|
r.Delete("/log-scan-rules/{id}", s.deleteLogScanRule)
|
|
r.Post("/log-scan-rules/{id}/test", s.testLogScanRule)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// System resources (read-only).
|
|
r.Get("/system/stats", s.getSystemStats)
|
|
r.Get("/system/stats/history", s.getSystemStatsHistory)
|
|
r.Get("/system/stats/top", s.listTopContainers)
|
|
|
|
// Admin-only routes: require admin role.
|
|
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
|
|
r.Use(auth.AdminOnly)
|
|
|
|
// Config export (reveals registry/global details).
|
|
r.Get("/config/export", s.exportConfig)
|
|
|
|
// Event log management.
|
|
r.Delete("/events/log/{id}", s.deleteEvent)
|
|
r.Delete("/events/log", s.clearEvents)
|
|
|
|
// Auth management.
|
|
r.Get("/auth/settings", s.getAuthSettings)
|
|
r.Put("/auth/settings", s.updateAuthSettings)
|
|
r.Get("/auth/users", s.listUsers)
|
|
r.Post("/auth/users", s.createUser)
|
|
r.Put("/auth/users/{uid}", s.updateUser)
|
|
r.Put("/auth/users/{uid}/password", s.changePassword)
|
|
r.Delete("/auth/users/{uid}", s.deleteUser)
|
|
|
|
// Registry creation.
|
|
r.Post("/registries", s.createRegistry)
|
|
|
|
// Stale container cleanup endpoints.
|
|
// Bulk route must be registered before parameterized route.
|
|
r.Post("/containers/stale/cleanup", s.bulkCleanupStaleContainers)
|
|
r.Post("/containers/stale/{id}/cleanup", s.cleanupStaleContainer)
|
|
|
|
// Settings endpoints.
|
|
r.Put("/settings", s.updateSettings)
|
|
|
|
// Global outgoing-webhook signing & test.
|
|
r.Get("/settings/notification-secret", s.getSettingsNotificationSecret)
|
|
r.Post("/settings/notification-secret/regenerate", s.regenerateSettingsNotificationSecret)
|
|
r.Post("/settings/notification-secret/disable", s.disableSettingsNotificationSigning)
|
|
r.Post("/settings/notification-test", s.settingsNotificationTest)
|
|
|
|
// Docker management.
|
|
r.Post("/docker/prune-images", s.pruneImages)
|
|
|
|
// NPM connection test.
|
|
r.Post("/settings/npm/test", s.testNpmConnection)
|
|
|
|
// DNS management endpoints.
|
|
r.Post("/settings/dns/test", s.testDNSConnection)
|
|
r.Post("/settings/dns/zones", s.listDNSZones)
|
|
r.Get("/dns/records", s.listDNSRecords)
|
|
r.Post("/dns/sync", s.syncDNSRecords)
|
|
r.Delete("/dns/records/{fqdn}", s.deleteDNSRecord)
|
|
|
|
// Backup endpoints.
|
|
r.Get("/backups", s.listBackups)
|
|
r.Post("/backups", s.triggerBackup)
|
|
r.Get("/backups/{id}/download", s.downloadBackup)
|
|
r.Delete("/backups/{id}", s.deleteBackup)
|
|
r.Post("/backups/{id}/restore", s.restoreBackup)
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
return r
|
|
}
|