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The clean-break delete that closes the workload-first refactor arc.
Net diff: ~30 backend files deleted, ~20 modified, ~12k LOC removed
on the Go side; entire /projects /stacks /sites /deploy frontend
trees gone; ~6.7k LOC removed on the Svelte/TypeScript side.
Backend
- API handlers gone: internal/api/{projects,stages,stage_env,stacks,
static_sites,deploys,instances,volume_browser}.go
- Store CRUD + tests gone: internal/store/{projects,stages,stage_env,
stacks,static_sites,static_site_secrets,deploys,poll_state,volumes,
workload_sync}.go (+ _test.go siblings)
- Legacy deployer pipeline gone: internal/deployer/{bluegreen,promote,
rollback,subdomain,resolver_test}.go; deployer.go trimmed to just the
dispatch surface used by the plugin pipeline
- internal/staticsite/{manager,healthcheck}.go and
internal/stack/manager.go gone (the rest of those packages stay as
helpers imported by the static + compose plugins)
- internal/registry/poller.go gone (legacy registry poller)
- internal/volume.ResolvePath gone; ResolveWorkloadPath stays
- internal/webhook: handleWebhook (project) + handleSiteWebhook (site)
gone; only POST /api/webhook/triggers/{secret} remains
- workload-side webhook URL handlers (getWorkloadWebhook +
regenerateWorkloadWebhook + EnsureWorkloadWebhookSecret +
SetWorkloadWebhookSecret + GetWorkloadByWebhookSecret) gone — they
minted URLs that would 404 against the new trigger-only ingress
- cmd/server/main.go: dropped staticsite.Manager, stack.Manager,
staticsite.HealthChecker, registry poller, SetSiteSyncTriggerer,
SetStaticSiteManager, SetStackManager, wireStaticBackend
- store/store.go: idempotent DROP TABLE IF EXISTS for every legacy
table (projects, stages, stage_env, volumes, deploys, deploy_logs,
poll_states, stacks, stack_revisions, stack_deploys, static_sites,
static_site_secrets); FK order children-then-parents
- store/models.go: dropped Project, Stage, Deploy, DeployLog, StageEnv,
Volume, StaticSite, StaticSiteSecret, Stack, StackRevision,
StackDeploy types; kept WorkloadKind constants as documented strings
- internal/store/helpers.go (new): BoolToInt, rowScanner,
GenerateWebhookSecret extracted from deleted CRUD files
- internal/api/secrets.go (new): forwards to store.GenerateWebhookSecret
so api + store paths share one secret-generation impl (no
panic-vs-UUID-fallback divergence)
- internal/reconciler/reconciler.go: dropped legacy stack-by-compose
+ static-site label paths; only canonical tinyforge.workload.id
dispatch remains
- providers (gitea_content/github_provider/gitlab_provider) gained
path-traversal rejection on every tree entry
- internal/webhook ParsedImage / ParseImageRef demoted to package-
private (no external callers)
Frontend
- /projects /stacks /sites /deploy routes deleted (entire trees)
- ProjectCard / InstanceCard / StaleContainerCard components deleted
- api.ts: dropped every project/stage/stack/site/deploy/instance
helper + types (Project, Stage, Stack, StaticSite, Deploy,
Instance, Volume, etc.); kept Workload, Container, App, Settings,
Registry, EventTrigger, LogScanRule, webhook envelopes
- WorkloadWebhook type + getWorkloadWebhook/regenerateWorkloadWebhook
api functions gone (mirror of the backend deletion above)
- web/src/routes/+layout.svelte: dropped /projects /sites /stacks
/deploy nav entries, trimmed quick-nav keymap
- web/src/routes/+page.svelte: dashboard rewrite — reads
listWorkloads + listContainers only; 4-card stat grid
(workloads/running/failed/stale) + recent workloads strip
- navCounts.ts, SystemHealthCard.svelte, ContainerLogs.svelte,
ContainerStats.svelte, StatusBadge.svelte, TagCombobox.svelte,
proxies/+page.svelte, containers/+page.svelte all rewired to the
workload-first surface
- AbortController plumbing on dashboard, nav-counts, stale page,
SystemHealthCard so navigation doesn't leave dangling fetches
- i18n: dropped projects.*, projectDetail.*, envEditor.*,
volumeEditor.*, volumeBrowser.*, quickDeploy.*, sites.*, stacks.*,
instance.*, confirm.* namespaces; en/ru parity preserved (1042
keys each)
Hardening from go-reviewer + security-reviewer + typescript-reviewer
subagent passes (0 CRITICAL across all three; 1 HIGH + ~12 MEDIUM
addressed inline before commit):
- Sec H1: dead-end workload webhook URL handlers (would mint URLs
that 404 the new trigger-only ingress) deleted across backend +
frontend
- Go M1: IsTerminalDeployStatus dropped (no production callers)
- Go M2: ParsedImage/ParseImageRef lowercased (in-package only)
- Go M6: generateWebhookSecret unified — api shim forwards to
store.GenerateWebhookSecret
- Doc/comment freshness: stage_id (no longer FK), ProxyRoute legacy
field names, workloadIDRow rationale, webhook_deliveries.target_type
enum, WebhookDeliveryLog component header
Doc
- WORKLOAD_REFACTOR_TODO: cutover marked DONE; all three Priority 1
items are now shipped. Next focus is Priority 3 polish (apps.* i18n
+ codemap entries) and Priority 4 tests.
Behavioral notes for operators upgrading from a pre-cutover build
- Existing rows in the dropped tables disappear on first boot.
- Legacy webhook URLs at /api/webhook/{secret} and
/api/webhook/sites/{secret} return 404; CI configs must repoint to
/api/webhook/triggers/{secret} (the trigger-split boot backfill
lifted any embedded workload secret onto a Trigger row, so the
secret value itself carries over).
- Frontend routes /projects /stacks /sites /deploy are gone; nav
links replaced with /apps and /triggers.
197 lines
5.7 KiB
Go
197 lines
5.7 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"runtime/debug"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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// logging is an HTTP middleware that logs every request with method, path,
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// status code, and duration. Webhook URLs are redacted before being logged
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// because the secret is the only authenticator — leaking it to log
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// aggregators is equivalent to leaking the credential.
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func logging(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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start := time.Now()
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wrapped := &statusRecorder{ResponseWriter: w, status: http.StatusOK}
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next.ServeHTTP(wrapped, r)
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slog.Info("http request",
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"method", r.Method,
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"path", redactPath(r.URL.Path),
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"status", wrapped.status,
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"duration", time.Since(start).String(),
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)
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})
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}
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// redactPath strips secrets from URL paths that carry them in segments.
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// Only the canonical /api/webhook/triggers/{secret} surface remains after
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// the hard cutover.
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func redactPath(path string) string {
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const triggerPrefix = "/api/webhook/triggers/"
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if strings.HasPrefix(path, triggerPrefix) {
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return triggerPrefix + "***"
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}
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return path
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}
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// recovery is an HTTP middleware that catches panics and returns a 500 response.
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func recovery(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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defer func() {
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if err := recover(); err != nil {
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slog.Error("panic recovered", "error", err, "stack", string(debug.Stack()))
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respondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal server error")
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}
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}()
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// securityHeaders sets standard security headers on all responses.
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func securityHeaders(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
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w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
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w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
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w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; font-src 'self'")
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// cors is an HTTP middleware that handles CORS for same-origin requests.
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// The frontend is served from the same origin, so cross-origin requests are not expected.
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func cors(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// The frontend is served from the same origin, so cross-origin
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// requests are not expected. We do NOT reflect the Origin header
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// back, as that would allow any website to make credentialed requests.
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// If cross-origin support is needed in the future, maintain an
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// explicit allowlist of trusted origins here.
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// maxBodySize limits request body sizes to prevent memory exhaustion.
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const maxBodySize = 1 << 20 // 1 MB
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func limitBody(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBodySize)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// rateLimiter provides per-IP rate limiting for login endpoints.
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type rateLimiter struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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attempts map[string][]time.Time
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lastCleanup time.Time
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}
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func newRateLimiter() *rateLimiter {
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return &rateLimiter{
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attempts: make(map[string][]time.Time),
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lastCleanup: time.Now(),
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}
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}
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// allow checks if the IP is allowed to make another request.
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// Returns false if the IP has exceeded the limit (10 requests per minute).
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func (rl *rateLimiter) allow(ip string) bool {
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rl.mu.Lock()
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defer rl.mu.Unlock()
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now := time.Now()
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window := now.Add(-1 * time.Minute)
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// Periodically clean all stale IPs to prevent memory leak.
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if now.Sub(rl.lastCleanup) > 5*time.Minute {
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for k, times := range rl.attempts {
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filtered := times[:0]
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for _, t := range times {
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if t.After(window) {
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filtered = append(filtered, t)
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}
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}
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if len(filtered) == 0 {
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delete(rl.attempts, k)
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} else {
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rl.attempts[k] = filtered
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}
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}
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rl.lastCleanup = now
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}
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// Clean old entries for this IP.
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filtered := rl.attempts[ip][:0]
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for _, t := range rl.attempts[ip] {
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if t.After(window) {
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filtered = append(filtered, t)
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}
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}
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rl.attempts[ip] = filtered
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if len(filtered) >= 10 {
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return false
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}
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rl.attempts[ip] = append(rl.attempts[ip], now)
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return true
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}
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// jsonContentType is an HTTP middleware that sets the default Content-Type to JSON.
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func jsonContentType(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// rateLimitMiddleware wraps a handler with per-IP rate limiting using the
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// supplied limiter. Requests over the limit get 429.
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func rateLimitMiddleware(rl *rateLimiter) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ip := r.RemoteAddr
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if fwd := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); fwd != "" {
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ip = fwd
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}
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if !rl.allow(ip) {
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respondError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "rate limit exceeded")
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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// statusRecorder wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture the status code.
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type statusRecorder struct {
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http.ResponseWriter
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status int
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}
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func (r *statusRecorder) WriteHeader(code int) {
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r.status = code
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r.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
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}
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// Flush delegates to the underlying ResponseWriter if it supports http.Flusher (needed for SSE).
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func (r *statusRecorder) Flush() {
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if f, ok := r.ResponseWriter.(http.Flusher); ok {
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f.Flush()
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}
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}
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