Files
tiny-forge/internal/volume/browser.go
T
alexei.dolgolyov 0491849f0f fix(volume-browser): address security review findings
Critical fixes:
- IDOR: verify volume belongs to project before resolving path
- Upload: override global 1MB body limit for upload endpoint (100MB)

High-priority fixes:
- Symlink escape: use filepath.EvalSymlinks in safePath validation
- Remove host filesystem path from browse API response
- Sanitize Content-Disposition filenames, force application/octet-stream
- Strip directory components from upload filenames
2026-04-01 23:17:35 +03:00

209 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

package volume
import (
"archive/zip"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
)
// FileEntry represents a single file or directory in a volume listing.
type FileEntry struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
IsDir bool `json:"is_dir"`
Size int64 `json:"size"`
ModTime time.Time `json:"mod_time"`
}
// ListDir returns the contents of a directory within a volume root.
// The relativePath is validated to stay within rootPath.
func ListDir(rootPath, relativePath string) ([]FileEntry, error) {
absPath, err := safePath(rootPath, relativePath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
info, err := os.Stat(absPath)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return []FileEntry{}, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("stat directory: %w", err)
}
if !info.IsDir() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("path is not a directory")
}
entries, err := os.ReadDir(absPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read directory: %w", err)
}
result := make([]FileEntry, 0, len(entries))
for _, e := range entries {
info, err := e.Info()
if err != nil {
continue
}
result = append(result, FileEntry{
Name: e.Name(),
IsDir: e.IsDir(),
Size: info.Size(),
ModTime: info.ModTime().UTC(),
})
}
return result, nil
}
// OpenFile opens a file within the volume root for reading.
// The caller is responsible for closing the returned file.
func OpenFile(rootPath, relativePath string) (*os.File, os.FileInfo, error) {
absPath, err := safePath(rootPath, relativePath)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
info, err := os.Stat(absPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("stat file: %w", err)
}
if info.IsDir() {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("path is a directory, use download as zip")
}
f, err := os.Open(absPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("open file: %w", err)
}
return f, info, nil
}
// WriteZip writes the contents of a directory (or the entire root) as a zip archive to w.
func WriteZip(rootPath, relativePath string, w io.Writer) error {
absPath, err := safePath(rootPath, relativePath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
info, err := os.Stat(absPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("stat path: %w", err)
}
if !info.IsDir() {
return fmt.Errorf("path is not a directory")
}
zw := zip.NewWriter(w)
defer zw.Close()
return filepath.Walk(absPath, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
rel, err := filepath.Rel(absPath, path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rel == "." {
return nil
}
// Use forward slashes in zip entries.
rel = filepath.ToSlash(rel)
if info.IsDir() {
_, err := zw.Create(rel + "/")
return err
}
header, err := zip.FileInfoHeader(info)
if err != nil {
return err
}
header.Name = rel
header.Method = zip.Deflate
writer, err := zw.CreateHeader(header)
if err != nil {
return err
}
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer f.Close()
_, err = io.Copy(writer, f)
return err
})
}
// SaveFile writes uploaded content to a file within the volume root.
func SaveFile(rootPath, relativePath string, r io.Reader) error {
absPath, err := safePath(rootPath, relativePath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Ensure parent directory exists.
dir := filepath.Dir(absPath)
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create directory: %w", err)
}
f, err := os.Create(absPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create file: %w", err)
}
defer f.Close()
if _, err := io.Copy(f, r); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write file: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// safePath resolves a relative path within rootPath and validates it doesn't escape.
// Resolves symlinks to prevent symlink-based traversal attacks.
func safePath(rootPath, relativePath string) (string, error) {
if relativePath == "" {
return rootPath, nil
}
// Clean and ensure no traversal.
cleaned := filepath.Clean(relativePath)
if strings.Contains(cleaned, "..") {
return "", fmt.Errorf("path traversal not allowed")
}
absPath := filepath.Join(rootPath, cleaned)
// Resolve the root path (follow symlinks in the root itself).
absRoot, err := filepath.Abs(rootPath)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve root: %w", err)
}
if realRoot, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absRoot); err == nil {
absRoot = realRoot
}
// Resolve the target path including symlinks.
absResolved, err := filepath.Abs(absPath)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve path: %w", err)
}
if realResolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absResolved); err == nil {
absResolved = realResolved
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(absResolved, absRoot) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("path traversal not allowed")
}
return absPath, nil
}