alexei.dolgolyov
f1cfb61d13
Security hardening (CRITICAL/HIGH from production-readiness audit):
- Require strong JWT_SECRET + separate INTEGRATION_ENCRYPTION_KEY at boot;
refuse placeholder defaults. Integration key now derived via HKDF.
- SSRF guard (src/lib/server/utils/safeFetch.ts): DNS-resolves and rejects
RFC1918/loopback/link-local/IPv4-mapped IPv6/decimal-IP/cloud-metadata.
Manual redirect handling re-validates each 3xx Location hop. Applied to
healthcheck, RSS, calendar, metric, system-stats, camera, notifications,
discovery, apps/preview, and all integration clients.
- API tokens, session refresh tokens, invite tokens, password-reset tokens
switched from bcrypt to sha256 with @unique indexed lookup (O(1) instead
of O(N) bcrypt-compares; eliminates a trivial DoS).
- Refresh-token reuse detection via Session.previousTokenHash.
- Permission checks on App PATCH/DELETE and Widget/Section endpoints.
- /api/integrations/alerts now requires auth.
- SVG uploads sanitized through DOMPurify (svg profile, scheme allow-list).
- Custom CSS sanitizer + selector scoping (decodes CSS unicode escapes
before pattern match, drops forbidden at-rules incl. @import without
whitespace, strips dangerous url() args). Scoped to .custom-css-scope.
- Backup restore validates SQLite magic header, takes a safety snapshot,
uses atomic rename, re-applies pragmas.
- SQLite WAL + busy_timeout + foreign_keys + synchronous=NORMAL at startup.
- Healthcheck scheduler was dead code; wired in hooks.server.ts with
HMR-safe singleton, concurrency cap, overlap prevention, retention jobs
for AppClick/Notification/AuditLog. Composite indexes added on hot paths.
- Security headers (CSP, HSTS-on-https, X-Frame-Options, Permissions-Policy)
emitted on every response.
- Account-enumeration mitigation on login (dummy bcrypt on no-user/oauth
branches) + rate limiting on login/register/onboarding/refresh/invite/
password-reset.
- OAuth callback sanitizes IdP error_description before echoing.
New features:
- Custom +error.svelte pages (root + boards + admin) via shared
ErrorState component. Inverted hierarchy (status as label, title as hero).
- /forgot-password + /reset-password + admin-mediated /admin/password-resets
page. SHA256 tokens, 24h TTL, all sessions revoked on apply.
- /invite page for manual invite-token redemption.
- /api/metrics Prometheus exposition with optional METRICS_TOKEN bearer
auth. Counters for login/healthcheck/notification/integration; gauges
for users/boards/apps + per-status app counts.
- Webhook HMAC-SHA256 signing for HTTP notification channels (optional
shared secret + configurable signature header, default X-Signature-256).
- PATCH /api/users/me/password for self-service password change.
- Persistent uploads at /app/data/uploads with served-from-volume handler
at /uploads/[...path]. SVGs served with CSP: sandbox.
- /api/health does a DB ping; returns 503 on disconnect.
- Public /status filtered to guest-accessible-board apps when unauthenticated.
- Audit log coverage: LOGIN_SUCCESS/FAILED, LOGOUT, OAUTH_LOGIN,
OAUTH_USER_PROVISIONED, SESSION_REVOKED, API_TOKEN_*, INVITE_*,
APP_UPDATED, PASSWORD_CHANGED, PASSWORD_RESET_*.
Performance:
- Board page: removed double findAll() over-fetch; include links + appTags
in board query; widgets lazy-loaded via dynamic imports (marked,
DOMPurify, hls.js, integration renderers).
- uptimeService.getAllAppsUptime: single batched query instead of N+1.
- 30s in-memory user-locals cache; invalidated on user mutation.
- pruneOldStatuses: single window-function DELETE instead of N+1.
Code quality:
- Typed error classes (NotFoundError, PermissionError, RateLimitError,
IntegrationError) with toHttpError mapper.
- Locals.user shape exposes avatarUrl and narrows role via guard.
- App input types derived from Zod schemas via z.infer.
- 274 tests passing (up from 212); 62 new tests covering SSRF guard,
CSS sanitizer, SVG sanitizer, rate limiter.
CI / Docker / config:
- Test workflow adds build, docker-build, audit jobs. Release workflow
uses buildx multi-arch (amd64+arm64) with provenance + SBOM.
- Dockerfile uses tini, multi-stage prune, persistent uploads dir, single
prisma migrate deploy (no destructive db push fallback).
- docker-compose: JWT_SECRET + INTEGRATION_ENCRYPTION_KEY required at
startup, log rotation, resource limits.
- README documents breaking-change upgrade path.
Bug fixes from UI/UX review:
- ~55 missing i18n keys added to en/ru (auth flows, error pages, admin
nav, register invite banner, settings.card_style).
- Hardcoded English on login replaced with $t('auth.remember_me').
- Admin nav uses i18n keys; mobile horizontal-scroll layout.
- Page <title> tags standardized.
- Password-resets: separated error/info/success surfaces, ConfirmDialog
replaces window.confirm.
- Auth pages have matching lucide icon badges.
- Webhook secret has eye toggle and monospace input.
- text-green-500 → text-emerald-500 to match codebase convention.
Pre-existing CI lint failures cleaned up (31 errors → 0): each-key
attributes added, unused-svelte-ignore comments removed, two any casts
typed, dead skeleton components removed, /boards/[id]/edit redirect to
inline edit mode.
Tests: 274 / 274 passing
Type check: 0 errors / 0 warnings
Build: green
60 lines
2.1 KiB
Bash
60 lines
2.1 KiB
Bash
# --- Database ---
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DATABASE_URL="file:../data/launcher.db"
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# --- Authentication (REQUIRED) ---
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# Generate a strong secret with: openssl rand -hex 32
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# The server refuses to start with placeholder or short values (< 32 chars).
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JWT_SECRET=""
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JWT_EXPIRY="15m"
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REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY="7d"
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# --- Integration credential encryption (REQUIRED if any integration is configured) ---
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# Must be DIFFERENT from JWT_SECRET so rotating one does not invalidate the other.
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# Generate a strong secret with: openssl rand -hex 32
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INTEGRATION_ENCRYPTION_KEY=""
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# --- Application ---
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APP_PORT=3000
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APP_HOST="0.0.0.0"
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# ORIGIN must match the public URL users visit. When it begins with https://,
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# session cookies are issued with the Secure flag. Set this when running behind
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# a reverse proxy that terminates TLS, e.g. ORIGIN="https://launcher.example.com"
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ORIGIN="http://localhost:3000"
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# Legacy alias — keep for older docs; not used internally.
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APP_URL="http://localhost:3000"
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# --- OAuth / OIDC (optional — configure here or in Admin > Settings) ---
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OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=""
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OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=""
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OAUTH_DISCOVERY_URL=""
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OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI=""
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# Guest mode (true = allow unauthenticated dashboard access to guest-accessible boards)
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GUEST_MODE="true"
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# Healthcheck cron expression — default every 5 minutes
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HEALTHCHECK_CRON="*/5 * * * *"
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HEALTHCHECK_TIMEOUT_MS="5000"
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# Service Discovery (optional — configure here or in Admin > Settings)
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DOCKER_SOCKET_PATH="/var/run/docker.sock"
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TRAEFIK_API_URL=""
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# Allow outbound fetches to private/internal hosts. Default is "false" which
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# blocks SSRF (loopback, RFC1918, link-local, cloud-metadata). Self-hosted
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# users monitoring services on a LAN typically want this set to "true".
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ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_FETCH="false"
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# Run background jobs (healthcheck, backup) in THIS process. Set to "false" when
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# scaling horizontally so only one node runs schedulers.
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RUN_SCHEDULERS="true"
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# Optional bearer token for /api/metrics. When set, scrapers must send
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# `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. When unset, the endpoint is open (typical
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# when the scraper lives on the same private network).
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METRICS_TOKEN=""
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# Node environment
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NODE_ENV="production"
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