f1cfb61d13
Security hardening (CRITICAL/HIGH from production-readiness audit):
- Require strong JWT_SECRET + separate INTEGRATION_ENCRYPTION_KEY at boot;
refuse placeholder defaults. Integration key now derived via HKDF.
- SSRF guard (src/lib/server/utils/safeFetch.ts): DNS-resolves and rejects
RFC1918/loopback/link-local/IPv4-mapped IPv6/decimal-IP/cloud-metadata.
Manual redirect handling re-validates each 3xx Location hop. Applied to
healthcheck, RSS, calendar, metric, system-stats, camera, notifications,
discovery, apps/preview, and all integration clients.
- API tokens, session refresh tokens, invite tokens, password-reset tokens
switched from bcrypt to sha256 with @unique indexed lookup (O(1) instead
of O(N) bcrypt-compares; eliminates a trivial DoS).
- Refresh-token reuse detection via Session.previousTokenHash.
- Permission checks on App PATCH/DELETE and Widget/Section endpoints.
- /api/integrations/alerts now requires auth.
- SVG uploads sanitized through DOMPurify (svg profile, scheme allow-list).
- Custom CSS sanitizer + selector scoping (decodes CSS unicode escapes
before pattern match, drops forbidden at-rules incl. @import without
whitespace, strips dangerous url() args). Scoped to .custom-css-scope.
- Backup restore validates SQLite magic header, takes a safety snapshot,
uses atomic rename, re-applies pragmas.
- SQLite WAL + busy_timeout + foreign_keys + synchronous=NORMAL at startup.
- Healthcheck scheduler was dead code; wired in hooks.server.ts with
HMR-safe singleton, concurrency cap, overlap prevention, retention jobs
for AppClick/Notification/AuditLog. Composite indexes added on hot paths.
- Security headers (CSP, HSTS-on-https, X-Frame-Options, Permissions-Policy)
emitted on every response.
- Account-enumeration mitigation on login (dummy bcrypt on no-user/oauth
branches) + rate limiting on login/register/onboarding/refresh/invite/
password-reset.
- OAuth callback sanitizes IdP error_description before echoing.
New features:
- Custom +error.svelte pages (root + boards + admin) via shared
ErrorState component. Inverted hierarchy (status as label, title as hero).
- /forgot-password + /reset-password + admin-mediated /admin/password-resets
page. SHA256 tokens, 24h TTL, all sessions revoked on apply.
- /invite page for manual invite-token redemption.
- /api/metrics Prometheus exposition with optional METRICS_TOKEN bearer
auth. Counters for login/healthcheck/notification/integration; gauges
for users/boards/apps + per-status app counts.
- Webhook HMAC-SHA256 signing for HTTP notification channels (optional
shared secret + configurable signature header, default X-Signature-256).
- PATCH /api/users/me/password for self-service password change.
- Persistent uploads at /app/data/uploads with served-from-volume handler
at /uploads/[...path]. SVGs served with CSP: sandbox.
- /api/health does a DB ping; returns 503 on disconnect.
- Public /status filtered to guest-accessible-board apps when unauthenticated.
- Audit log coverage: LOGIN_SUCCESS/FAILED, LOGOUT, OAUTH_LOGIN,
OAUTH_USER_PROVISIONED, SESSION_REVOKED, API_TOKEN_*, INVITE_*,
APP_UPDATED, PASSWORD_CHANGED, PASSWORD_RESET_*.
Performance:
- Board page: removed double findAll() over-fetch; include links + appTags
in board query; widgets lazy-loaded via dynamic imports (marked,
DOMPurify, hls.js, integration renderers).
- uptimeService.getAllAppsUptime: single batched query instead of N+1.
- 30s in-memory user-locals cache; invalidated on user mutation.
- pruneOldStatuses: single window-function DELETE instead of N+1.
Code quality:
- Typed error classes (NotFoundError, PermissionError, RateLimitError,
IntegrationError) with toHttpError mapper.
- Locals.user shape exposes avatarUrl and narrows role via guard.
- App input types derived from Zod schemas via z.infer.
- 274 tests passing (up from 212); 62 new tests covering SSRF guard,
CSS sanitizer, SVG sanitizer, rate limiter.
CI / Docker / config:
- Test workflow adds build, docker-build, audit jobs. Release workflow
uses buildx multi-arch (amd64+arm64) with provenance + SBOM.
- Dockerfile uses tini, multi-stage prune, persistent uploads dir, single
prisma migrate deploy (no destructive db push fallback).
- docker-compose: JWT_SECRET + INTEGRATION_ENCRYPTION_KEY required at
startup, log rotation, resource limits.
- README documents breaking-change upgrade path.
Bug fixes from UI/UX review:
- ~55 missing i18n keys added to en/ru (auth flows, error pages, admin
nav, register invite banner, settings.card_style).
- Hardcoded English on login replaced with $t('auth.remember_me').
- Admin nav uses i18n keys; mobile horizontal-scroll layout.
- Page <title> tags standardized.
- Password-resets: separated error/info/success surfaces, ConfirmDialog
replaces window.confirm.
- Auth pages have matching lucide icon badges.
- Webhook secret has eye toggle and monospace input.
- text-green-500 → text-emerald-500 to match codebase convention.
Pre-existing CI lint failures cleaned up (31 errors → 0): each-key
attributes added, unused-svelte-ignore comments removed, two any casts
typed, dead skeleton components removed, /boards/[id]/edit redirect to
inline edit mode.
Tests: 274 / 274 passing
Type check: 0 errors / 0 warnings
Build: green
183 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript
183 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
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// Mock prisma before importing authService
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vi.mock('../../prisma.js', () => ({
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prisma: {
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session: {
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create: vi.fn(),
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findUnique: vi.fn(),
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update: vi.fn(),
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deleteMany: vi.fn(),
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findMany: vi.fn()
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}
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}
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}));
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// Set JWT_SECRET for tests — must be ≥ 32 chars and not a known placeholder
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// (enforced by getJwtSecret in authService).
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process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'test-secret-key-for-unit-tests-must-be-at-least-32-chars-long';
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import {
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hashPassword,
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verifyPassword,
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signAccessToken,
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verifyAccessToken,
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generateRefreshToken,
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createSession,
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rotateSession,
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validateSession
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} from '../authService.js';
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import { prisma } from '../../prisma.js';
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describe('authService', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.clearAllMocks();
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});
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describe('hashPassword / verifyPassword', () => {
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it('hashes a password and verifies it correctly', async () => {
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const password = 'mySecurePassword123';
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const hash = await hashPassword(password);
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expect(hash).not.toBe(password);
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expect(hash.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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const isValid = await verifyPassword(password, hash);
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expect(isValid).toBe(true);
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});
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it('rejects wrong password', async () => {
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const hash = await hashPassword('correct-password');
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const isValid = await verifyPassword('wrong-password', hash);
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expect(isValid).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe('signAccessToken / verifyAccessToken', () => {
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it('signs and verifies a token', () => {
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const payload = { userId: 'usr-1', email: 'test@test.com', role: 'user' };
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const token = signAccessToken(payload);
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expect(typeof token).toBe('string');
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expect(token.split('.')).toHaveLength(3);
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const decoded = verifyAccessToken(token);
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expect(decoded.userId).toBe('usr-1');
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expect(decoded.email).toBe('test@test.com');
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expect(decoded.role).toBe('user');
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});
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it('throws for invalid token', () => {
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expect(() => verifyAccessToken('invalid.token.value')).toThrow(
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'Invalid or expired access token'
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);
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});
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});
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describe('generateRefreshToken', () => {
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it('generates a prefixed hex string', () => {
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const token = generateRefreshToken();
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expect(typeof token).toBe('string');
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// "rt_" prefix (3) + 48 bytes * 2 hex chars (96) = 99
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expect(token.length).toBe(99);
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expect(token.startsWith('rt_')).toBe(true);
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expect(/^rt_[0-9a-f]+$/.test(token)).toBe(true);
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});
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it('generates unique tokens', () => {
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const token1 = generateRefreshToken();
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const token2 = generateRefreshToken();
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expect(token1).not.toBe(token2);
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});
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});
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describe('createSession', () => {
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it('creates a session row and returns the raw refresh token', async () => {
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vi.mocked(prisma.session.create).mockResolvedValue({
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id: 'ses-1',
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userId: 'usr-1',
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tokenHash: 'hash',
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label: 'Chrome on Windows',
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userAgent: 'ua',
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ipAddress: '127.0.0.1',
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rememberMe: false,
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lastUsedAt: new Date(),
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expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
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createdAt: new Date()
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} as never);
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const result = await createSession('usr-1', { userAgent: 'ua', ipAddress: '127.0.0.1' });
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expect(result.sessionId).toBe('ses-1');
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// Tokens are now prefixed with "rt_" (3 chars) + 96 hex chars = 99
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expect(result.refreshToken.length).toBe(99);
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expect(result.refreshToken.startsWith('rt_')).toBe(true);
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expect(result.expiresAt.getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
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expect(prisma.session.create).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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});
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it('extends expiry for remember-me sessions', async () => {
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vi.mocked(prisma.session.create).mockImplementation(
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(({ data }: { data: Record<string, unknown> }) =>
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Promise.resolve({
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id: 'ses-2',
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...data,
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lastUsedAt: new Date(),
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createdAt: new Date()
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})) as never
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);
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const result = await createSession('usr-1', { rememberMe: true });
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const diffDays = (result.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
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expect(diffDays).toBeGreaterThan(29);
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expect(diffDays).toBeLessThan(31);
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});
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});
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describe('validateSession', () => {
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it('returns null for missing session', async () => {
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vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValue(null);
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const result = await validateSession('ses-x', 'token');
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expect(result).toBeNull();
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});
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it('returns null for expired session', async () => {
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vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
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id: 'ses-1',
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userId: 'usr-1',
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tokenHash: 'hash',
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rememberMe: false,
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expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000),
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lastUsedAt: new Date(),
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createdAt: new Date(),
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label: null,
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userAgent: null,
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ipAddress: null
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} as never);
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const result = await validateSession('ses-1', 'token');
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expect(result).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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describe('rotateSession', () => {
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it('updates token hash and keeps the same session id', async () => {
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vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
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id: 'ses-1',
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userId: 'usr-1',
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rememberMe: false,
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expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 1000)
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} as never);
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vi.mocked(prisma.session.update).mockResolvedValue({} as never);
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const result = await rotateSession('ses-1');
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expect(result.sessionId).toBe('ses-1');
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// Tokens are now prefixed with "rt_" (3 chars) + 96 hex chars = 99
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expect(result.refreshToken.length).toBe(99);
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expect(result.refreshToken.startsWith('rt_')).toBe(true);
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expect(prisma.session.update).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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});
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});
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});
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