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web-app-launcher/src/lib/server/services/auditLogService.ts
T
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feat: production hardening + password reset, metrics, signed webhooks
Security hardening (CRITICAL/HIGH from production-readiness audit):
- Require strong JWT_SECRET + separate INTEGRATION_ENCRYPTION_KEY at boot;
  refuse placeholder defaults. Integration key now derived via HKDF.
- SSRF guard (src/lib/server/utils/safeFetch.ts): DNS-resolves and rejects
  RFC1918/loopback/link-local/IPv4-mapped IPv6/decimal-IP/cloud-metadata.
  Manual redirect handling re-validates each 3xx Location hop. Applied to
  healthcheck, RSS, calendar, metric, system-stats, camera, notifications,
  discovery, apps/preview, and all integration clients.
- API tokens, session refresh tokens, invite tokens, password-reset tokens
  switched from bcrypt to sha256 with @unique indexed lookup (O(1) instead
  of O(N) bcrypt-compares; eliminates a trivial DoS).
- Refresh-token reuse detection via Session.previousTokenHash.
- Permission checks on App PATCH/DELETE and Widget/Section endpoints.
- /api/integrations/alerts now requires auth.
- SVG uploads sanitized through DOMPurify (svg profile, scheme allow-list).
- Custom CSS sanitizer + selector scoping (decodes CSS unicode escapes
  before pattern match, drops forbidden at-rules incl. @import without
  whitespace, strips dangerous url() args). Scoped to .custom-css-scope.
- Backup restore validates SQLite magic header, takes a safety snapshot,
  uses atomic rename, re-applies pragmas.
- SQLite WAL + busy_timeout + foreign_keys + synchronous=NORMAL at startup.
- Healthcheck scheduler was dead code; wired in hooks.server.ts with
  HMR-safe singleton, concurrency cap, overlap prevention, retention jobs
  for AppClick/Notification/AuditLog. Composite indexes added on hot paths.
- Security headers (CSP, HSTS-on-https, X-Frame-Options, Permissions-Policy)
  emitted on every response.
- Account-enumeration mitigation on login (dummy bcrypt on no-user/oauth
  branches) + rate limiting on login/register/onboarding/refresh/invite/
  password-reset.
- OAuth callback sanitizes IdP error_description before echoing.

New features:
- Custom +error.svelte pages (root + boards + admin) via shared
  ErrorState component. Inverted hierarchy (status as label, title as hero).
- /forgot-password + /reset-password + admin-mediated /admin/password-resets
  page. SHA256 tokens, 24h TTL, all sessions revoked on apply.
- /invite page for manual invite-token redemption.
- /api/metrics Prometheus exposition with optional METRICS_TOKEN bearer
  auth. Counters for login/healthcheck/notification/integration; gauges
  for users/boards/apps + per-status app counts.
- Webhook HMAC-SHA256 signing for HTTP notification channels (optional
  shared secret + configurable signature header, default X-Signature-256).
- PATCH /api/users/me/password for self-service password change.
- Persistent uploads at /app/data/uploads with served-from-volume handler
  at /uploads/[...path]. SVGs served with CSP: sandbox.
- /api/health does a DB ping; returns 503 on disconnect.
- Public /status filtered to guest-accessible-board apps when unauthenticated.
- Audit log coverage: LOGIN_SUCCESS/FAILED, LOGOUT, OAUTH_LOGIN,
  OAUTH_USER_PROVISIONED, SESSION_REVOKED, API_TOKEN_*, INVITE_*,
  APP_UPDATED, PASSWORD_CHANGED, PASSWORD_RESET_*.

Performance:
- Board page: removed double findAll() over-fetch; include links + appTags
  in board query; widgets lazy-loaded via dynamic imports (marked,
  DOMPurify, hls.js, integration renderers).
- uptimeService.getAllAppsUptime: single batched query instead of N+1.
- 30s in-memory user-locals cache; invalidated on user mutation.
- pruneOldStatuses: single window-function DELETE instead of N+1.

Code quality:
- Typed error classes (NotFoundError, PermissionError, RateLimitError,
  IntegrationError) with toHttpError mapper.
- Locals.user shape exposes avatarUrl and narrows role via guard.
- App input types derived from Zod schemas via z.infer.
- 274 tests passing (up from 212); 62 new tests covering SSRF guard,
  CSS sanitizer, SVG sanitizer, rate limiter.

CI / Docker / config:
- Test workflow adds build, docker-build, audit jobs. Release workflow
  uses buildx multi-arch (amd64+arm64) with provenance + SBOM.
- Dockerfile uses tini, multi-stage prune, persistent uploads dir, single
  prisma migrate deploy (no destructive db push fallback).
- docker-compose: JWT_SECRET + INTEGRATION_ENCRYPTION_KEY required at
  startup, log rotation, resource limits.
- README documents breaking-change upgrade path.

Bug fixes from UI/UX review:
- ~55 missing i18n keys added to en/ru (auth flows, error pages, admin
  nav, register invite banner, settings.card_style).
- Hardcoded English on login replaced with $t('auth.remember_me').
- Admin nav uses i18n keys; mobile horizontal-scroll layout.
- Page <title> tags standardized.
- Password-resets: separated error/info/success surfaces, ConfirmDialog
  replaces window.confirm.
- Auth pages have matching lucide icon badges.
- Webhook secret has eye toggle and monospace input.
- text-green-500 → text-emerald-500 to match codebase convention.

Pre-existing CI lint failures cleaned up (31 errors → 0): each-key
attributes added, unused-svelte-ignore comments removed, two any casts
typed, dead skeleton components removed, /boards/[id]/edit redirect to
inline edit mode.

Tests: 274 / 274 passing
Type check: 0 errors / 0 warnings
Build: green
2026-05-26 19:51:21 +03:00

105 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript

import { prisma } from '../prisma.js';
/**
* Record an audit log entry. Non-blocking: catches and swallows errors
* to avoid slowing down the operation being audited.
*/
export function logAction(
userId: string | null,
action: string,
entityType: string,
entityId: string,
details?: Record<string, unknown>
): void {
prisma.auditLog
.create({
data: {
userId,
action,
entityType,
entityId,
details: details ? JSON.stringify(details) : '{}'
}
})
.catch((err) => {
// Non-blocking but observable: log to stderr so a failing audit trail
// (e.g. DB full, locked) is visible in container logs.
console.warn(
`[audit] failed to record ${action} ${entityType}:${entityId}:`,
err
);
});
}
/**
* Query audit logs with filters and pagination.
*/
export async function getAuditLogs(options?: {
action?: string;
entityType?: string;
userId?: string;
startDate?: string;
endDate?: string;
limit?: number;
offset?: number;
}) {
const where: Record<string, unknown> = {};
if (options?.action) {
where.action = options.action;
}
if (options?.entityType) {
where.entityType = options.entityType;
}
if (options?.userId) {
where.userId = options.userId;
}
const dateFilter: Record<string, Date> = {};
if (options?.startDate) {
dateFilter.gte = new Date(options.startDate);
}
if (options?.endDate) {
dateFilter.lte = new Date(options.endDate);
}
if (Object.keys(dateFilter).length > 0) {
where.createdAt = dateFilter;
}
const limit = options?.limit ?? 50;
const offset = options?.offset ?? 0;
const [logs, total] = await Promise.all([
prisma.auditLog.findMany({
where,
orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
take: limit,
skip: offset,
include: {
user: {
select: { id: true, displayName: true, email: true }
}
}
}),
prisma.auditLog.count({ where })
]);
return { logs, total };
}
/**
* Delete audit logs older than the given retention period.
*/
export async function pruneOldLogs(retentionDays: number = 90) {
const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - retentionDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
const result = await prisma.auditLog.deleteMany({
where: {
createdAt: { lt: cutoff }
}
});
return result.count;
}