f1cfb61d13
Security hardening (CRITICAL/HIGH from production-readiness audit):
- Require strong JWT_SECRET + separate INTEGRATION_ENCRYPTION_KEY at boot;
refuse placeholder defaults. Integration key now derived via HKDF.
- SSRF guard (src/lib/server/utils/safeFetch.ts): DNS-resolves and rejects
RFC1918/loopback/link-local/IPv4-mapped IPv6/decimal-IP/cloud-metadata.
Manual redirect handling re-validates each 3xx Location hop. Applied to
healthcheck, RSS, calendar, metric, system-stats, camera, notifications,
discovery, apps/preview, and all integration clients.
- API tokens, session refresh tokens, invite tokens, password-reset tokens
switched from bcrypt to sha256 with @unique indexed lookup (O(1) instead
of O(N) bcrypt-compares; eliminates a trivial DoS).
- Refresh-token reuse detection via Session.previousTokenHash.
- Permission checks on App PATCH/DELETE and Widget/Section endpoints.
- /api/integrations/alerts now requires auth.
- SVG uploads sanitized through DOMPurify (svg profile, scheme allow-list).
- Custom CSS sanitizer + selector scoping (decodes CSS unicode escapes
before pattern match, drops forbidden at-rules incl. @import without
whitespace, strips dangerous url() args). Scoped to .custom-css-scope.
- Backup restore validates SQLite magic header, takes a safety snapshot,
uses atomic rename, re-applies pragmas.
- SQLite WAL + busy_timeout + foreign_keys + synchronous=NORMAL at startup.
- Healthcheck scheduler was dead code; wired in hooks.server.ts with
HMR-safe singleton, concurrency cap, overlap prevention, retention jobs
for AppClick/Notification/AuditLog. Composite indexes added on hot paths.
- Security headers (CSP, HSTS-on-https, X-Frame-Options, Permissions-Policy)
emitted on every response.
- Account-enumeration mitigation on login (dummy bcrypt on no-user/oauth
branches) + rate limiting on login/register/onboarding/refresh/invite/
password-reset.
- OAuth callback sanitizes IdP error_description before echoing.
New features:
- Custom +error.svelte pages (root + boards + admin) via shared
ErrorState component. Inverted hierarchy (status as label, title as hero).
- /forgot-password + /reset-password + admin-mediated /admin/password-resets
page. SHA256 tokens, 24h TTL, all sessions revoked on apply.
- /invite page for manual invite-token redemption.
- /api/metrics Prometheus exposition with optional METRICS_TOKEN bearer
auth. Counters for login/healthcheck/notification/integration; gauges
for users/boards/apps + per-status app counts.
- Webhook HMAC-SHA256 signing for HTTP notification channels (optional
shared secret + configurable signature header, default X-Signature-256).
- PATCH /api/users/me/password for self-service password change.
- Persistent uploads at /app/data/uploads with served-from-volume handler
at /uploads/[...path]. SVGs served with CSP: sandbox.
- /api/health does a DB ping; returns 503 on disconnect.
- Public /status filtered to guest-accessible-board apps when unauthenticated.
- Audit log coverage: LOGIN_SUCCESS/FAILED, LOGOUT, OAUTH_LOGIN,
OAUTH_USER_PROVISIONED, SESSION_REVOKED, API_TOKEN_*, INVITE_*,
APP_UPDATED, PASSWORD_CHANGED, PASSWORD_RESET_*.
Performance:
- Board page: removed double findAll() over-fetch; include links + appTags
in board query; widgets lazy-loaded via dynamic imports (marked,
DOMPurify, hls.js, integration renderers).
- uptimeService.getAllAppsUptime: single batched query instead of N+1.
- 30s in-memory user-locals cache; invalidated on user mutation.
- pruneOldStatuses: single window-function DELETE instead of N+1.
Code quality:
- Typed error classes (NotFoundError, PermissionError, RateLimitError,
IntegrationError) with toHttpError mapper.
- Locals.user shape exposes avatarUrl and narrows role via guard.
- App input types derived from Zod schemas via z.infer.
- 274 tests passing (up from 212); 62 new tests covering SSRF guard,
CSS sanitizer, SVG sanitizer, rate limiter.
CI / Docker / config:
- Test workflow adds build, docker-build, audit jobs. Release workflow
uses buildx multi-arch (amd64+arm64) with provenance + SBOM.
- Dockerfile uses tini, multi-stage prune, persistent uploads dir, single
prisma migrate deploy (no destructive db push fallback).
- docker-compose: JWT_SECRET + INTEGRATION_ENCRYPTION_KEY required at
startup, log rotation, resource limits.
- README documents breaking-change upgrade path.
Bug fixes from UI/UX review:
- ~55 missing i18n keys added to en/ru (auth flows, error pages, admin
nav, register invite banner, settings.card_style).
- Hardcoded English on login replaced with $t('auth.remember_me').
- Admin nav uses i18n keys; mobile horizontal-scroll layout.
- Page <title> tags standardized.
- Password-resets: separated error/info/success surfaces, ConfirmDialog
replaces window.confirm.
- Auth pages have matching lucide icon badges.
- Webhook secret has eye toggle and monospace input.
- text-green-500 → text-emerald-500 to match codebase convention.
Pre-existing CI lint failures cleaned up (31 errors → 0): each-key
attributes added, unused-svelte-ignore comments removed, two any casts
typed, dead skeleton components removed, /boards/[id]/edit redirect to
inline edit mode.
Tests: 274 / 274 passing
Type check: 0 errors / 0 warnings
Build: green
105 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript
105 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { prisma } from '../prisma.js';
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/**
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* Record an audit log entry. Non-blocking: catches and swallows errors
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* to avoid slowing down the operation being audited.
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*/
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export function logAction(
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userId: string | null,
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action: string,
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entityType: string,
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entityId: string,
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details?: Record<string, unknown>
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): void {
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prisma.auditLog
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.create({
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data: {
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userId,
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action,
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entityType,
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entityId,
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details: details ? JSON.stringify(details) : '{}'
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}
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})
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.catch((err) => {
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// Non-blocking but observable: log to stderr so a failing audit trail
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// (e.g. DB full, locked) is visible in container logs.
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console.warn(
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`[audit] failed to record ${action} ${entityType}:${entityId}:`,
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err
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);
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});
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}
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/**
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* Query audit logs with filters and pagination.
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*/
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export async function getAuditLogs(options?: {
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action?: string;
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entityType?: string;
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userId?: string;
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startDate?: string;
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endDate?: string;
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limit?: number;
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offset?: number;
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}) {
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const where: Record<string, unknown> = {};
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if (options?.action) {
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where.action = options.action;
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}
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if (options?.entityType) {
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where.entityType = options.entityType;
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}
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if (options?.userId) {
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where.userId = options.userId;
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}
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const dateFilter: Record<string, Date> = {};
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if (options?.startDate) {
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dateFilter.gte = new Date(options.startDate);
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}
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if (options?.endDate) {
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dateFilter.lte = new Date(options.endDate);
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}
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if (Object.keys(dateFilter).length > 0) {
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where.createdAt = dateFilter;
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}
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const limit = options?.limit ?? 50;
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const offset = options?.offset ?? 0;
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const [logs, total] = await Promise.all([
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prisma.auditLog.findMany({
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where,
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orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
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take: limit,
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skip: offset,
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include: {
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user: {
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select: { id: true, displayName: true, email: true }
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}
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}
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}),
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prisma.auditLog.count({ where })
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]);
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return { logs, total };
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}
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/**
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* Delete audit logs older than the given retention period.
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*/
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export async function pruneOldLogs(retentionDays: number = 90) {
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const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - retentionDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
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const result = await prisma.auditLog.deleteMany({
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where: {
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createdAt: { lt: cutoff }
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}
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});
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return result.count;
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}
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