fa6d5bd3ba
Secrets defined once and applied to many workloads by scope (global or per-app), encrypted at rest and resolved into container env as a low-precedence default layer: global-shared < app-shared < image cfg.Env < workload_env. A workload with no applicable shared secrets is byte-identical to the prior workload_env-only behavior. - store: shared_secrets table + CRUD + ListApplicableSharedSecrets (enabled global + app, global-first), UNIQUE(scope,app_id,name). - plugin.ResolveSharedSecrets + integration into BuildWorkloadEnv (static/dockerfile) and image buildEnv; best-effort — a shared-secret store/decrypt error never fails a deploy, and values are never logged. - REST CRUD at /api/shared-secrets (reads authed, mutations AdminOnly); values encrypted at the boundary via crypto.Encrypt and never returned (only a has_value flag), mirroring workload_env. UNIQUE collisions 409. Compose is out of scope (YAML-defined env). Frontend rule UI is Phase 2. Reviewed: go + security APPROVE (0 CRITICAL/HIGH); two MEDIUMs fixed (translateSQLError -> 409, no driver-message leak). Deferred defense-in- depth: json:"-" on the model value + a description length cap.
101 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
101 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
package plugin
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"log/slog"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/alexei/tinyforge/internal/crypto"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// ResolveSharedSecrets returns the applicable shared secrets (global, then
|
|
// app-scoped overlaying global) as a decrypted KEY->VALUE map. Decrypt
|
|
// failures log + skip the one entry (mirroring BuildWorkloadEnv). Best-effort:
|
|
// a store error logs and returns an empty map so a shared-secret outage never
|
|
// fails a deploy.
|
|
//
|
|
// The store orders the rows global-first (then app), so iterating in order and
|
|
// writing into the map makes a later app-scoped entry with the same Name
|
|
// overwrite the global default — the intended global < app precedence.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: the compose plugin intentionally does NOT call this — compose env is
|
|
// YAML-defined and shared-secret support for compose is an explicit
|
|
// out-of-scope follow-up.
|
|
func ResolveSharedSecrets(deps Deps, appID, sourceName string) map[string]string {
|
|
merged := map[string]string{}
|
|
rows, err := deps.Store.ListApplicableSharedSecrets(appID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn(sourceName+": list shared secrets", "app", appID, "error", err)
|
|
return merged
|
|
}
|
|
for _, sec := range rows {
|
|
value := sec.Value
|
|
if sec.Encrypted {
|
|
decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(deps.EncKey, sec.Value)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn(sourceName+": decrypt shared secret",
|
|
"app", appID, "name", sec.Name, "error", err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
value = decrypted
|
|
}
|
|
merged[sec.Name] = value
|
|
}
|
|
return merged
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BuildWorkloadEnv flattens the applicable shared secrets plus workload_env
|
|
// rows into the KEY=VALUE list Docker expects. Shared by the source plugins
|
|
// (static, dockerfile) so they all handle decrypt failures the same way.
|
|
//
|
|
// Shared secrets are the low-precedence base layer; workload_env rows overlay
|
|
// them so a workload's own config always wins on a key conflict. A workload
|
|
// with no applicable shared secrets starts from an empty base, so the output
|
|
// is identical to the workload_env-only behavior that predated shared secrets.
|
|
//
|
|
// Encrypted rows are decrypted lazily so plaintext never lives in the store
|
|
// output. A decrypt failure logs and skips the entry rather than failing the
|
|
// whole deploy: bricking a sync/build because one rotated key missed an env
|
|
// entry would be worse than running with the variable unset and surfacing the
|
|
// warning.
|
|
//
|
|
// appID is the workload's app_id (plugin.Workload.GroupID), used to resolve
|
|
// app-scoped shared secrets. sourceName is the slog prefix the caller wants on
|
|
// the warning lines (e.g. "static source" / "dockerfile source") so existing
|
|
// log scrapers keep matching the per-source message text.
|
|
func BuildWorkloadEnv(deps Deps, workloadID, appID, sourceName string) []string {
|
|
// Base layer: shared secrets (global, then app overlaying global).
|
|
merged := ResolveSharedSecrets(deps, appID, sourceName)
|
|
|
|
rows, err := deps.Store.ListWorkloadEnv(workloadID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn(sourceName+": list workload env", "workload", workloadID, "error", err)
|
|
// Still return whatever shared secrets resolved; a workload_env
|
|
// outage shouldn't drop the shared defaults a deploy already has.
|
|
return flattenEnvMap(merged)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, e := range rows {
|
|
value := e.Value
|
|
if e.Encrypted {
|
|
decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(deps.EncKey, e.Value)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn(sourceName+": decrypt env value",
|
|
"workload", workloadID, "key", e.Key, "error", err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
value = decrypted
|
|
}
|
|
merged[e.Key] = value // workload_env overrides shared secrets
|
|
}
|
|
return flattenEnvMap(merged)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// flattenEnvMap turns a KEY->VALUE map into the KEY=VALUE slice Docker
|
|
// expects. Order is unspecified (map iteration) — Docker treats env as a
|
|
// set, and callers that need determinism sort downstream.
|
|
func flattenEnvMap(m map[string]string) []string {
|
|
out := make([]string, 0, len(m))
|
|
for k, v := range m {
|
|
out = append(out, k+"="+v)
|
|
}
|
|
return out
|
|
}
|