a4362b842d
Build / build (push) Successful in 11m42s
Security: - rate limit /api/webhook routes per-IP and cap concurrent site syncs - global SSE connection cap (256) with new sse_gate - validate ?tail= and cap JSON log responses at 4 MiB - strip ANSI/CSI/OSC and control bytes from streamed log lines - redact webhook secret from request log middleware - scrub host details from /api/health for non-admin viewers - drop container_id from /api/system/stats/top for non-admins - generate webhook secrets via crypto/rand; require >=32 chars on insert - verify iid path consistency in streamContainerLogs - LimitReader on site webhook body; reject malformed non-empty bodies Concurrency / correctness: - stats collector: Stop() no longer hangs without Start(), semaphore acquired in parent loop so ctx cancellation short-circuits the queue, in-flight tick cancellable via shared base context, zero-ts guard - webhook handler: replace fire-and-forget goroutine with WaitGroup-tracked workers + Drain() wired into graceful shutdown - $derived(() => ...) mis-idiom fixed in ContainerStats / InstanceCard / ProjectCard (returned function instead of value) - SystemResourcesCard: rename `window` and `t` locals to avoid shadowing globalThis.window and the i18n `t` import Quality / performance: - replace O(n^2) insertion sort with sort.Slice in stats top - runMigrations only swallows duplicate-column / already-exists errors - PruneStatsSamplesBefore wrapped in a transaction - collapse N+1 in unusedImageStats / pruneImages to one ListAllInstances pass; surface DB errors instead of silently treating them as inactive - run Docker Info + DiskUsage in parallel via errgroup - container log SSE emits `: ping` heartbeat every 20 s - imageMatches case-insensitive on registry host (RFC behaviour) - log warning on invalid stage tag pattern instead of silent skip - reject malformed non-empty site webhook payloads Frontend / i18n: - shared formatBytes utility replaces three local copies - statsInterval store drives dynamic "no samples / collection disabled" copy across ContainerStats and SystemResourcesCard - top consumers row now shows owner_name (project/stage or site name) - drop seven `as any` casts on the Settings type; add cloudflare_api_token write-only field - move "Service status", "Docker daemon", "Docker unreachable", "Proxy unreachable", "reachable", and "Docker daemon is not reachable." strings into en/ru i18n bundles
199 lines
5.7 KiB
Go
199 lines
5.7 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"runtime/debug"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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// logging is an HTTP middleware that logs every request with method, path,
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// status code, and duration. Webhook URLs are redacted before being logged
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// because the secret is the only authenticator — leaking it to log
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// aggregators is equivalent to leaking the credential.
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func logging(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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start := time.Now()
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wrapped := &statusRecorder{ResponseWriter: w, status: http.StatusOK}
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next.ServeHTTP(wrapped, r)
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slog.Info("http request",
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"method", r.Method,
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"path", redactPath(r.URL.Path),
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"status", wrapped.status,
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"duration", time.Since(start).String(),
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)
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})
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}
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// redactPath strips secrets from URL paths that carry them in segments.
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func redactPath(path string) string {
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const projectPrefix = "/api/webhook/"
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const sitePrefix = "/api/webhook/sites/"
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switch {
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case strings.HasPrefix(path, sitePrefix):
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return sitePrefix + "***"
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case strings.HasPrefix(path, projectPrefix):
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return projectPrefix + "***"
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}
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return path
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}
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// recovery is an HTTP middleware that catches panics and returns a 500 response.
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func recovery(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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defer func() {
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if err := recover(); err != nil {
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slog.Error("panic recovered", "error", err, "stack", string(debug.Stack()))
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respondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal server error")
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}
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}()
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// securityHeaders sets standard security headers on all responses.
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func securityHeaders(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
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w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
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w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
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w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; font-src 'self'")
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// cors is an HTTP middleware that handles CORS for same-origin requests.
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// The frontend is served from the same origin, so cross-origin requests are not expected.
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func cors(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// The frontend is served from the same origin, so cross-origin
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// requests are not expected. We do NOT reflect the Origin header
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// back, as that would allow any website to make credentialed requests.
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// If cross-origin support is needed in the future, maintain an
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// explicit allowlist of trusted origins here.
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// maxBodySize limits request body sizes to prevent memory exhaustion.
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const maxBodySize = 1 << 20 // 1 MB
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func limitBody(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBodySize)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// rateLimiter provides per-IP rate limiting for login endpoints.
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type rateLimiter struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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attempts map[string][]time.Time
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lastCleanup time.Time
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}
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func newRateLimiter() *rateLimiter {
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return &rateLimiter{
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attempts: make(map[string][]time.Time),
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lastCleanup: time.Now(),
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}
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}
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// allow checks if the IP is allowed to make another request.
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// Returns false if the IP has exceeded the limit (10 requests per minute).
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func (rl *rateLimiter) allow(ip string) bool {
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rl.mu.Lock()
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defer rl.mu.Unlock()
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now := time.Now()
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window := now.Add(-1 * time.Minute)
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// Periodically clean all stale IPs to prevent memory leak.
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if now.Sub(rl.lastCleanup) > 5*time.Minute {
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for k, times := range rl.attempts {
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filtered := times[:0]
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for _, t := range times {
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if t.After(window) {
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filtered = append(filtered, t)
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}
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}
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if len(filtered) == 0 {
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delete(rl.attempts, k)
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} else {
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rl.attempts[k] = filtered
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}
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}
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rl.lastCleanup = now
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}
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// Clean old entries for this IP.
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filtered := rl.attempts[ip][:0]
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for _, t := range rl.attempts[ip] {
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if t.After(window) {
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filtered = append(filtered, t)
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}
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}
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rl.attempts[ip] = filtered
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if len(filtered) >= 10 {
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return false
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}
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rl.attempts[ip] = append(rl.attempts[ip], now)
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return true
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}
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// jsonContentType is an HTTP middleware that sets the default Content-Type to JSON.
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func jsonContentType(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// rateLimitMiddleware wraps a handler with per-IP rate limiting using the
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// supplied limiter. Requests over the limit get 429.
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func rateLimitMiddleware(rl *rateLimiter) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ip := r.RemoteAddr
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if fwd := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); fwd != "" {
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ip = fwd
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}
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if !rl.allow(ip) {
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respondError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "rate limit exceeded")
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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// statusRecorder wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture the status code.
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type statusRecorder struct {
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http.ResponseWriter
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status int
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}
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func (r *statusRecorder) WriteHeader(code int) {
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r.status = code
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r.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
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}
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// Flush delegates to the underlying ResponseWriter if it supports http.Flusher (needed for SSE).
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func (r *statusRecorder) Flush() {
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if f, ok := r.ResponseWriter.(http.Flusher); ok {
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f.Flush()
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}
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}
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